Abstract One of the main obstacles that constantly stagnates development in El Salvador is its violence epidemic. The country has ranked high on indexes that measure homicides and criminality since the end of its brutal civil war in the early nineties. Main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS13), Barrio 18 and Barrio 18 Sure?os are often seen as the main responsibles for the increase in homicides, fear and insecurity throughout the country. In many communities these groups maintain a stronger hold than the actual government, they impose extortion on businesses, curfews on families, entry and exit restrictions for communities creating invisible yet very real borders that are not to be crossed by the populations they control. In the last years they have formalized their structures and amassed power through fear, being able to determine the number of homicides everyday or stop a whole country's transportation system. On the other hand, the strategy from the state to counter gangs influence has been similar to the ones it used for other problems during the last century of military hegemony, iron fist repression. Wide militarization of the public security systems in the country have been the go-to plan to accomplish this, whether by recovering El Salvador's Armed Forces' (FAES) autonomy and status from its haydays, delegitimizing the National Civil Police (PNC) and other public security institutions, increasing the number of soldiers performing public security tasks or militarizing the police and its activities. Salvadoran society has not known uninterrupted true peace in years and therefore the response of its political class and society has continued to be short-sighted unoriginal policies that give out similar results. In contrast to this response, 2012 saw the government negotiate with the gang structures through a truce successfully bringing down homicides nationally. This study measures the effects of these old and new strategies to see their actual effect on homicide rates in an attempt to determine which policies are more effective at protecting Salvadoran lives.Abstract One of the main obstacles that constantly stagnates development in El Salvador is its violence epidemic. The country has ranked high on indexes that measure homicides and criminality since the end of its brutal civil war in the early nineties. Main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS13), Barrio 18 and Barrio 18 Sure?os are often seen as the main responsibles for the increase in homicides, fear and insecurity throughout the country. In many communities these groups maintain a stronger hold than the actual government, they impose extortion on businesses, curfews on families, entry and exit restrictions for communities creating invisible yet very real borders that are not to be crossed by the populations they control. In the last years they have formalized their structures and amassed power through fear, being able to determine the number of homicides everyday or stop a whole country's transportation system. On the other hand, the strategy from the state to counter gangs influence has been similar to the ones it used for other problems during the last century of military hegemony, iron fist repression. Wide militarization of the public security systems in the country have been the go-to plan to accomplish this, whether by recovering El Salvador's Armed Forces' (FAES) autonomy and status from its haydays, delegitimizing the National Civil Police (PNC) and other public security institutions, increasing the number of soldiers performing public security tasks or militarizing the police and its activities. Salvadoran society has not known uninterrupted true peace in years and therefore the response of its political class and society has continued to be short-sighted unoriginal policies that give out similar results. In contrast to this response, 2012 saw the government negotiate with the gang structures through a truce successfully bringing down homicides nationally. This study measures the effects of these old and new strategies to see their actual effect on homicide rates in an attempt to determine which policies are more effective at protecting Salvadoran lives.