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**The relationship between non-electoral participation and  
democracy in Europe**

**Dissertation summary**

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## Introduction and Motivation for the Research

The tale of democracy is a collection of stories on the various types of political participation. Some are positive, and others are rather uninspiring. As such, some theorists of democracy chose to tell the cautionary tales while others preferred a more optimistic approach. However, these stories rarely mix in one setting. The goal of the dissertation is to provide an analytical overview of both approaches to the political participation in democratic theory, utilize their strengths, and test their limits. The relationship between participation and democracy is not as straightforward as originally thought, and there is a need for a re-evaluation on multiple levels. Most notably the values of participants have not been adequately incorporated into the democratic theory.

There is a strong tradition of the political science study devoted to the political participation and democracy. Historically, the research has focused on voting as the main mechanism of the liberal democracy. The studies of electoral behavior were able to paint a vivid picture of voters based on their sociodemographic and psychological traits. There is also a universal agreement that higher turnout is beneficial for democracy (see Machin, 2011, p. 103). However, it became apparent that the free elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a liberal democracy (Zakaria, 2007). With the increasing electoral volatility and voters' dealignment in the past decades (cf. the studies in 1960s e.g., Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), it became clear that understanding voting is not enough to correctly analyze contemporary democracy. The increase in political sophistication, democratization and digitalization have widened the opportunities for citizens to participate outside the election. Furthermore, the generational values have shifted in the direction of self-expression and emancipative values (Inglehart, 1971). As a result, there has been a rise and expansion of the non-electoral participation (NEP).

As with electoral behavior, the body of literature devoted to the NEP has grown substantially in the past three decades. Nowadays, we understand that socioeconomic status (Verba & Nie, 1972) is only one of the key resources that help explain why some citizens participate and others do not (Brady et al., 1995). Researchers have also explored how changing civic norms translate in changing patterns of participation (Dalton, 2008; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Welzel et al., 2005). Overall, there is a substantial body of literature devoted to the differences among groups in the type of participation (Canache, 2012; Schlozman et al., 2010) or its amount both on the individual level (Dalton 2008; Bolzendahl & Coffee 2013; Gherghina

& Geisel 2017; Webb, 2013) and on the level of states (Vlachová & Lebeda, 2006; Vráblíková, 2013).

Therefore, we have a better understanding of what drives the NEP. Yet, we are not sure about the relationship between NEP and democracy. In comparison to voting, there is not a universal agreement about the benefits of NEP. On one hand, citizens' participation can serve as a tool for empowerment (Arnstein, 1969) and better responsiveness (Pateman, 2012). On the other hand, NEP might immobilize the government with conflicting demands (Lijphart, 1989, p. 51) or even threaten the stability of democracy when non-democrats get involved (Dahl, 1956 p. 88–89). The key problem is that NEP is unstructured and covers almost an endless variety of acts. While voting is always pretty much the same act of political participation, NEP differs in intensity, type and transferred information (Schlozman et al., 2012). Thus, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, p. 5) remarked, one cannot agree with the assumption that any participation of any sort is good.

The effects of NEP on democracy are directly linked to the question of how much participation democracy needs. There are vastly different takes on this topic and over the years NEP became essentially the main differentiating factor among individual theories of democracy (Teorell, 2006). Moreover, the question about the effects of NEP is not only theoretical. It has key practical implications for democracy as it effects the responsiveness and effectiveness of government. As Larry Diamond (2007, p. 119) remarked, the specter haunting democracy today is bad governance. Therefore, he stresses the need for a revolutionary change that would bring a better, more accountable, and more transparent form of governance. Otherwise, the low government effectiveness will slowly turn into dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy which, over time, translates into low support for democracy as a system (see Dahl, 1971, p. 149; Easton, 1975; Lipset, 1959b, p. 89; Magalhães, 2013).

The relationship between NEP and democracy then rests upon three fundamental questions: *(1) How does the overall level of non-electoral participation influence government effectiveness? (2) Does the impact of non-electoral participation on government effectiveness differ based on the motivation of participants? (3) How do individual democratic values influence non-electoral participation?* Only an empirical approach provide answers and Europe is an ideal place to start such an endeavor. Historically, Europe was a starting point of the early theories of democracy, and it has hosted both successes stories and democratic failures. Today Europe can help us again understand the role of NEP in modern liberal democracy and contemporary democratic theory overall. It offers necessary variation in NEP and government

effectiveness while presenting units that are comparable allowing for the cross-country time series analysis. Furthermore, the country specific data from the Czech Republic complement the macro analysis. They can shed light on threat of democratic deconsolidation on the micro-level and uncover the relationship between democratic values and NEP.

The general goal of this thesis is to add new evidence to the contemporary theories of democracy which are often based on examples dating back to the middle of the 20th century. The original empirical research is outdated. Though, one thing has not changed at all. The interaction between values and behavior remains as important as ever. This represents the key to decipher the enigma of participation. Civic norms were crucial for Almond and Verba (1963) more than 50 years ago and continue to play a vital role today. Outside the academic and philosophical debate, these norms influence the structure of civic education as the question of “What kind of citizen we need?” is directly linked to the normative expectations about citizens’ behavior (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). The same is true for the debate on the institutional setting of democracy or democratic innovations (Sousa Santos, 1998; Vráblíková, 2013). The motivation to explore this relationship between democratic values and participation is due to the fact that neither of the two major streams of democratic theory offer a satisfying answer.

## Theoretical Background

The main problem researcher faces when answering questions regarding the relationship between NEP and democracy is the discontinuity of democratic theory. The idea of widespread political participation gave birth to democracy. For a while, the concepts of popular political participation and democracy were inseparable. The notion that everyone could and should be involved in decision-making was crucial for Periklēs as well as for the classical theorists who were certain about the benefits of popular participation. J.S. Mill praised its educational function and J.J. Rousseau saw it as the *sine qua non* of democracy.

However, the collapse of inter-war democratic regimes led some scholars to re-evaluate the relationship between mass participation and democracy. The experience with totalitarian regimes pointed to the potential threat of mass participation. For some the large levels of NEP represented an autoimmune disease and they feared that too much participation might kill democracy. Researchers based their theories on the early empirical findings rather than the normative ideals. Resulting empirical theory of democracy thus focused on the role of institutions and the stability of regimes. The question of participation was left on the periphery of interest rather than in the center of the theory.

Political reality of the Cold War certainly helped to sideline the corresponding question of the quality of democracy for the next forty years. Stability of the democratic regimes and democratization were the key research topics. Then, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of history (see Fukuyama, 1989, 2006), democracy lost its main adversary, and it was on the rise. Variation in the democratic theory seemed to be only a topic for the political theorists. However, the recent failure of the two-decades-long process of democracy building in Afghanistan shows that it has crucial practical implications. Once more it is necessary to ask what kind of democracy is desired.

Individual approaches vary mainly in the reasoning if and why political participation is needed (see Dahl, 1956, 1971; Habermas, 1987; Pateman, 1970, 2012). Some see it as an opportunity for a better democracy (Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970; MacPherson, 1977; Barber, 1984), and others view this as a possible threat to the stability of the democratic system (Dahl, 1956; Sartori, 1987; Huntington, 1975). On the theoretical level the main conflict thus lies within the quality of the status quo; whether contemporary representative democracy is the best system which cannot be improved and thus these efforts only pose a threat; or the representative democracy can be improved and attempts to make it more participatory should be made. Where

the participatory theory blames the lack of participation from preventing the emergence of a better system, the empirical theory takes some apathy as a precondition of the stability of the current one. Thus, the question can be restated as whether participation has a positive impact on government effectiveness, none at all, or can be potentially harmful.

Although omission of NEP from the democratic theory has been criticized for decades, it remains an unresolved issue at the heart of the theory of democracy. When it comes to NEP the theory of democracy is full of contradictions and paradoxes. Empirical theory of democracy focuses on the role of institutions and procedures. The attitudes and behavior of citizens often play a marginal role and emphasis is on the structure of the whole system. In its pure form, empirical theory of democracy comes close to the political elitism of Mosca and Pareto (see Sartori, 1987, p. 157). As such it struggles with the question of legitimacy when it tries to explain the puzzle of representation without popular participation (see also Verba, 1996, p. 2). Moreover, there is also only a loose connection between empirical practice and normative theory (McAllister, 2017, p. 10, 16-17; Teorell, 2006). Ever since Shumpeter's (1947) writings, the focus is on the daily practice of democracy and not normative ideas about its function.

Correspondingly, the relationship between trust in government and action represents a paradox of its own. On one hand, trust is needed for the effective operation of government. On the other hand, citizens should remain cautious and control the government. The civic culture that mixes both trust and cautiousness seemingly cuts through the Gordian knot of trade-off between government effectiveness and accountability. However, it focuses only on the potentially active citizens, not their actual involvement (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 339–347), resulting in a mirage of accountability and effectiveness. In the end, the empirical theory of democracy sees participation mostly as a tool without an intrinsic value. Participation is perceived as an input to the system and therefore the focus is mainly on the representativeness of participating citizens (Dahl, 2006; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1987; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012).

The theories of participatory democracy and deliberative democracy offer different takes which are supposed to improve the empirical theory of democracy. However, they are not without flaws. Both often disregard the initial values of citizens (Clark, 2014, p. 3; Berman, 1997; Chambers & Kopstein, 2001; Mutz, 2006). The participation of previously democratically educated citizens then supposes to have solely positive impacts and the more participation there is, the better democracy (Pateman, 1970, p. 105). However, the participatory democracy corner themselves by creating the paradox of the ideal citizen and vicious circle of

participation. The problem is that the ideal participant can be only created through the educative process of participation itself in the first place (MacPherson, 1977). Deliberative democrats then focus on the process of deliberation as the solution to the legitimation problem of the empirical theory. Yet, it faces the same problems. It also relies on the procedural logic of the empirical theory (Bohman, 1990). Deliberation is supposed to be democratic process and thus it legitimizes the democracy through the process of discussion. All the outputs from deliberation are thus assumed to be automatically democratic.

The crucial issue of the democratic theory is that the theoretical and normative disagreements reflect outdated empirical findings. The theory is still shaped by the case studies of the inter-war democracies and the first post-war empirical studies. This research showed that authoritarian-minded citizens were politically passive and came from the lower social strata (see e.g., Lipset, 1959a). Some therefore feared that excessive participation might lower the consensus on democratic norms within the civic culture as it brings new people in (Almond & Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1956; see also Krouse, 1982). Participation serves as a medium through which harmful ideas enter the political arena. On the other hand, participation might not just educate citizens (Putnam, 1993) but also serve as a tool for empowerment (Arnstein, 1969).

Thus, the main difference between the two approaches lies not only in the amount of necessary participation, but it also centers around the expectation about the citizens values. Both competing schools of thought offer imperfect answers. Strong democracy takes from the thinkers of classical democracy and presents mostly normative arguments in favor of citizens' values. Based on Mill's writing, it assumes that it is possible to educate citizens to participate for a common good. The other stream of theory was built on the empirical experience between 1940s and 1960s and subsequently expects some citizens to be neither active nor have democratic values. As such the theories either assume society which is yet to be built or society long gone.

After more than half a century, the debate continues. However, the world around us has changed and brings new issues with it. It seems that democratic theory is still catching up to the substantial political and social change that has occurred over the last three decades (see Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The democratization and rapid development of technology has brought new inputs (Barber, 1984, p. ix–xix). Civic norms are changing (Dalton, 2008; Dalton & Welzel, 2014), and the party systems cannot absorb these shocks as hoped in the 1980s. Yet, the values of participant remain to be as important as ever. The discrepancy between empirical theory of democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy



can be solved only through the combination of values and action in to one theoretical and empirical approach.

However, the democratic values turned out to be more elusive nowadays. They represent a multilevel phenomenon that cannot be separated only into two categories. Nowadays, the threat of pure, authoritarian-oriented participation is admittedly less acute than in the first half of the 20th century. For a brief moment in the 1990s, it even seemed that democracy was the only game in town. Yet quite soon it became apparent that some citizens paid democracy only lip service (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003), and the understanding of democracy among citizens was not universal (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). The novelty of the situation is given by the range of regime preferences involved. There are both democracies with adjectives (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) and competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2002). These regimes have some democratic features but omit some of the core principles. Citizens' democratic values follow the same logic, and it is not possible to divide them into clear-cut democratic and non-democratic groups anymore.

The stability of democratic regimes still dominates the study of comparative politics (Stockemer & Carbonetti, 2010, p. 237), and the two schools of democratic thought presented in this thesis still represent the core theoretical framework. Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011, p. 591) remarked that most notably that the empirical theory of democracy is the driving force of research on political participation and comparative politics (see also McAllister, 2017). However, there are different threats for the democratic stability nowadays. In Europe we observe various forms of democratic malaise, and some of the post-communist states are showing a declining consensus on the liberal values (Dawson & Hanley, 2016). The counter wave to democratization does not come in the form of sudden rupture (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Instead, it comes in the form of weakening of democracy and often leaves just the shallow electoral democracies in place (Diamond, 1999). The debate whether there could be a deconsolidation in sight still rages on as shown by the lively debate in the *Journal of Democracy* (Foa & Mounk, 2016; Plattner, 2017; Foa & Mounk, 2017). Nevertheless, the continuous underperformance of government would be the first step (Lipset, 1959b, 1995).

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## Structure of the Dissertation

The theoretical part provides an analytical overview of the two competing schools of thought of the democratic theory to set the ground for their, in terms of Hegelian dialectic, synthesis. Chapter 1.1 demarcates the scope of the dissertation by focusing on the difference between voting and NEP. Subsequent chapter offers context for the historical development of the democratic theory which is necessary to understand the current state of the research. The difference in the view of NEP is based on the divergent paths these schools of thought took when forming the theory.

Chapters 1.3 and 1.4 present the two approaches to the NEP in democratic theory. The optimistic view of NEP argues that the mass involvement of citizens could improve the government effectiveness, most notably in the areas of responsiveness and accountability (see Chapter 1.4.3). Therefore, NEP should lead to an improved democracy. On the other hand, skeptics warn that excessive NEP is a potential threat, and it might incapacitate the government (see Chapter 1.3). Such idea is, perhaps, best captured in the Charles de Gaulle rhetorical question about France: “How can you govern a country which has 246 varieties of cheese?” (Knowles, 1999, p. 255).

Chapter 2 argues that the latter quarrel about NEP in fact leads to the discussion about values and attitudes of participating citizens. Sceptics see NEP only as a tool without intrinsic values. NEP solely spreads the values and attitudes of participants throughout the society. As such they distance beliefs and actions (see Easton, 1975, p. 436). Skeptics fear that non-democratic values are dormant in society and apathy of citizens serves as a containment. This idea comes from the structural-functionalist approach that was popular until the 1960s. It assumed that the elements of society such as norms and institutions naturally evolved to perform some function. The function of apathy in democracy was then to stop non-democratic values from spreading and shield the government from too many irreconcilable demands.

The optimistic view about NEP instead focuses on the action itself. The process of participation and deliberation endows citizens with civic competences and democratic values. More participation thus leads to more democrats with increased participation. In the end, NEP creates a better informed and more democratic public. Moreover, the vivid participation leads to a more responsive and accountable government. Policy articulation and implementation

improve and more closely correspond to the needs of the public. Therefore, everybody should participate.

Most of the theoretical background to the contemporary theory of democracy was built in between the 1950s and the 1980s. Chapter 3 responds to the first two chapters and complements them with the research conducted over the past three decades. It aims on synthesis of the two approaches through the integration of the concept of the civic culture as a part of the empirical theory of democracy and the direct action as a part of strong democracy. As such it focuses on the combined effects of values and action. In this chapter I argue that the dilemma of the immediate role of NEP can be settled by focusing on the values of participants that can help us understand the variation in the information transferred through NEP (see also Brady, Schlozman, & Verba, 2018).

From the theoretical chapter it is apparent that the relationship between values, participation and democracy must be addressed on two different levels. First, it is necessary to examine the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness on the systemic level of states. The first analytical chapter (Chapter 4) focuses on the macro level which can uncover the relationships that influence the whole system. It provides a rigorous overview of methodology, individual models and discussion of results. Six different models add to the evidence that voting itself is not enough for a high-quality democracy. Overall, they indicate that NEP does not threaten the government effectiveness and mostly has a positive impact. Yet, there are key differences based on the type of NEP. The positive effect of the overall proportion of citizens engaging in NEP seems to be driven by the conventional NEP, the NEP done by citizens who are satisfied with the way democracy works, and the NEP of citizens feeling the attachment to the democratic system. On the other hand, the protest NEP, the NEP of dissatisfied citizens and, the NEP of citizens less attached to the democratic system has no effect.

The results of Chapter 4 clearly show that the macro-level hypotheses are based on the micro-level assumptions. Focus on macro-level societal norms thus cannot disregard the individual agency of citizens. To substantially add to the democratic theory, Chapter 5 utilizes the micro-level analysis with individuals as the unit of analysis. As such, it complements Chapter 4 on both the theoretical and analytical level. This setting is important to address the effect of individual democratic values on participation itself. The playing field of democracy has changed profoundly, and the individual level analysis can grasp these changes better.

Chapter 5 reveals that nowadays there are multiple groups when it comes to liberal democratic values which cannot be identified through one survey question. Chapter 5.2 therefore utilizes country specific questions in the 2014 Czech ISSP Citizenship Module IV survey concerned with different dimensions of liberal democracy. First it uses cluster analysis to classify citizens into groups based on their democratic and liberal values: Liberal Democrats, Liberal Non-democrats, Illiberal Democrats, and Xenophobic Democrats. Chapter 5.3 then provides theoretical arguments in favor of different participatory behavior of these groups and tests them empirically. The models show that these groups not only differ in the amount of participation, but also the conditions under which they participate.

Together the analytical part clearly demonstrates that the role of NEP in contemporary democracy is more complex. The main contribution of this dissertation is that it relates the empirical tests to the overall democratic theory. The accumulation of sufficient evidence is the first step needed for the re-evaluation of any theory. In the end, it seems that the fears of the empirical democrats regarding the pressure of NEP on the government effectiveness seem unwarranted in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. On the other hand, it is crucial to pay attention to who and under which circumstances participates. The participatory democracy and the deliberative democracy cannot be based on the assumption that the initial values of citizens do not matter. The resounding conclusion of this dissertation is nevertheless the need for the incorporation of the NEP into the contemporary theory of democracy. To do so it is necessary to consider the democratic values of both participants and non-participants. The values and attitudes of citizens shape how they participate and what are the effects of their actions on the democracy.

## Methodology

When it comes to the democratic theory it might seem that the most acute problem researchers are facing is theoretical. However, to the same extent it is also methodological. NEP offers more flexibility to citizens than voting. Through NEP, citizens can express their demands more freely, and researchers can analyze the relationship between values, attitudes, and behavior more closely. However, the variation in immediate motives of citizens related to action is too great for an analysis based on survey data. The specific motivation is almost impossible to decode, and the overall civic culture is hard to measure. Still, as Van Deth (2014, p. 350)

remarked, “[...] neglecting the goals or intentions of citizens as a defining feature of political participation would throw out the baby with the bathwater.”

Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, I utilize the more persistent values and attitudes as a proxy measure of citizens’ motives. Although they represent imperfect tools, they allow us to derive basic generalizations. The mysteries of contemporary democracy can be uncovered only through the combination of data about both the European states and values, attitudes, and behavior of their citizens. Furthermore, it is now common knowledge that simple survey questions about democratic preference does not capture the intricacy of democratic values. Sadly, complex data about the democratic values are not broadly available and researchers must utilize more specific sources.

Second problem is the choice of the appropriate sample for the analysis. Some early works in the field that helped shape democratic theory have been criticized based on their methodology. The main questions were whether their units of analysis were fundamentally comparable, or whether the generalizations could be based on a limited number of isolated cases. In the end, Europe is the best region for the revision of democratic theory. European inter-war democracies and their collapses were the key cases shaping the birth of the empirical theory of democracy. Mass participation in European totalitarian regimes further shaped the opinions of theorists in the first half of the 20th century. Europe also demonstrates the modernization of society and change in the behavior of its citizens. Methodologically, Europe is still a culturally homogeneous region yet with variations in civic norms and democratic preferences. It offers a great variation in both NEP and government effectiveness. Even though this dissertation focuses on the overall role of NEP in democratic theory, the analysis is limited to within the Europe borders. The systemic analysis is complemented by the individual level analysis of Czech citizens that is based on country specific datasets.

Chapter 4 therefore utilizes cross-country time-series data of European democracies between 2002 and 2016. It combines datasets from the European Social Survey and the World Bank to present the macro-level analysis with the unit of analysis of country-year. The European region was chosen as the pooled research design used in this dissertation must first provide the comparability of individual cross-sections. The main concern should always be whether the units of analysis are fundamentally comparable (see Sayrs, 1989), and the basic homogeneity of the cross-sections on the dependent variable is necessary (see Stimson 1985). Second, Europe provides the required variation in the levels of NEP (see Figure 10 in dissertation’s Appendix) and levels of government effectiveness (see Figure 4 in Chapter 4.2).

Similar macro-analysis is common in the econometrics because of the large T datasets (for an example of interdisciplinary research see Gerring et al., 2005). It is less common in political science, yet political scientists are no strangers to the cross-country time-series analysis. However, in political science, such research is often challenged on the methodological grounds. There are important limits to the favorite method of the OLS regression with calculation of the panel-corrected standard errors. Chapter 4.1. therefore, provides thorough analysis methods and potential issues. Among them the most issues that need to be addressed are the unit heterogeneity and non-spherical errors, i.e., heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and serial correlation resulting in the model misspecification.

In the cross-country time-series setting the errors tend to be autocorrelated, i.e., temporally dependent. The country  $I$  at the time period  $t$  inclines to be correlated with the same country  $i$  at the time  $t-1$ . Some characteristics of countries are either time invariant or reflect previous values, e.g., population, GDP, degree of democracy. The OLS assumes that there should be no connection between the observation of the Czech Republic in 2018 and the Czech Republic in the 2019, or between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2018, or between the Czech Republic in 2018 and Slovakia in 2019. In general the violation of the IID assumption (of  $\text{Cov}(u_i, u_j) = 0, i \neq j$ , and the homoscedasticity) means that OLS is no longer an efficient estimator which means that the standard errors are not correct. To overcome the issue researchers have come up with methods which fix these shortcomings. Chapter 4.1 provides a lead on how to approach such issues.

The macro-analysis then uses the government effectiveness as a dependent variable. Chapter 4.2 specifies multiple models to test whether the theories build in the 20<sup>th</sup> century still hold. First, the overall levels of NEP or civic culture enter the models. Subsequently the effect of NEP is disaggregated to consider its type or values and attitudes of participating citizens. I combine the data from the World Governance Indicator with the aggregated data from the European Social Survey. The first provides the dependent variable and controls for various measures of socioeconomic development of countries, e.g., unemployment or years of democracy. The latter includes the key independent variables in the form of NEP and citizens values.

The results clearly show that the macro-level hypotheses are based on the micro-level relationship between democratic values and participation. The structural level effects of NEP on government effectiveness cannot be properly understood without data about who and under which conditions participates. Chapter 5 therefore utilizes the micro-level analysis with



individuals as the unit of analysis. One of the main critiques of the empirical theory of democracy was that it was driven solely by the limited empirical findings of its time. The theory of strong democracy then instead started with solely normative assumptions which however often bypassed the empirical findings. To avoid the same pitfalls, the ideal process shall start with specification of normative subcategories of liberal democracy and then identify the existing groups based on data. Chapter 5.2 thus describes the process of the classification of citizens into individual groups based on the cluster analysis.

One of the reasons more granular categories of democratic values are comparatively under researched is the fact that surveys often do not dedicate substantial space to questions addressing the fuzzy nature of democracy. As a result, the simple question on support for democracy constitutes an imprecise measure of support to democracy which has multiple dimensions (Canache et al., 2001; Quaranta, 2018; Anderson, 2002). One indicator fails to acknowledge that citizens have various hierarchies of values when it comes to different dimensions of democracy (Flanagan et al., 2005) and stress some areas more than others. The 2014 International Social Survey Programme Citizenship II module for the Czech Republic represents an exception. It is uniquely suited for in depth analysis as it offers items capturing the three dimensions of liberal democracy most endangered by the illiberal surge.

Table 1 - The overview of survey items used for the cluster analysis

Democracy (1–5)	E19 - I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.
	E20 - Democracy is the best form of government for a country like ours
Abstract liberal values (1–7)	There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:
	Q29. That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities
	Q32. That governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances
Right of minorities (1–7)	This list presents various groups of people. Mark all of those that you think should not be allowed to hold public meetings:
	Vietnamese, Gay, Catholics, Jew, Roma, Muslim, Ukrainian

Clustering on individual survey data is still a rare yet not unfamiliar method in political science (see Verba & Nie, 1972). In past, it was often used on macro-level to classify democratic regimes on the state level (Gugiu & Centellas, 2013) or subnational level (Vatter & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2013). It also enables classification of states in relation to conflict (Wolfson et al.; 2004), welfare state (Saint-Arnaud & Bernard, 2003), or capitalism (McMenamin, 2004). In relation to understanding democracy Flanagan et al. (2005) utilized cluster analysis to classify students into groups based on aspects of democracy they stress more. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) used hierarchical clustering to increase the validity of measurement of the pro-democratic support. In this text I build up on their approach with the goal of not being reliant on one sole dimension of declared pro-democratic support.

The process has two crucial parts. First, I apply the so-called tandem approach, i.e., the dimension reduction techniques to obtain the three dimensions of liberal democracy followed by the hierarchical cluster analysis by Ward's method.<sup>1</sup> This part of analysis provides insight into the number of clusters and their cluster centers. The clustering of cases as used here is an exploratory classification technique. Therefore, it represents an unsupervised method i.e., the number of groups and their property is not known in advance. Main guiding principle is that cases inside clusters are similar in relation to the observed variables, and dissimilar to cases outside the cluster (Everitt, 1993). In the second step, I used the information on the number of clusters and their centers. They enter the analysis as an input for the k-means clustering procedure. The main benefit of the k-means method is that in contrast to hierarchical clustering its algorithm allows re-assigning of cases during the process as the centers of categories change. Therefore, it is also not that influenced by outliers as Ward's method and overall improves the final solution.

The result is classification of Czech citizens into groups based on their democratic and liberal values: Liberal Democrats, Liberal Non-democrats, Illiberal Democrats, and Xenophobic Democrats. I specify the OLS models with interaction effects to test the differences among groups. Without interaction the effect is assumed to be the same for all groups. Therefore, the common coefficient is shaped mostly by the groups with larger variation and

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<sup>1</sup> PCA and clustering are complementary methods. PCA in the first stage reduces the "statistical noise" and subsequently leads to more robust clustering in next stage (see Husson et al., 2010). All initial variables were previously recoded to higher values represent higher preference for authoritarian/illiberal values. PCA also solves a problem of correlated variables as the Euclidean distance is used for cluster analysis. Variables entered the cluster analysis standardized.

group size. If most citizens would be liberal democrats like in the Western countries, the inclusion of interaction would be unnecessary. Models with interactions are also superior to estimation of separate models for each group because this approach can result in loss of statistical power. Furthermore, the comparison of significance of individual effects among groups does not represent a formal test of differences in slopes (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2002, p. 36). Models with interactions on the other hand enable deeper insight into focused questions and help to establish boundary conditions of effects (Hayes, 2018).

## Findings and their limits

The theoretical chapters clearly showed the need to test some of the core assumptions of the theories build in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Furthermore, new democratic impulses and social changes occurring over the past thirty years open new issues for the contemporary democracy. Chapter 4.2 therefore specified six different models to test the hypothesis set in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 (see the overview of hypotheses in Table 1 in Chapter 3 of the dissertation). The government effectiveness was the dependent variable, and the key independent variables were different types of NEP.

Table 3 summarizes the results of hypotheses testing. Overall, the models indicate that NEP does not threaten the government effectiveness and mostly has a positive impact. Yet, there are key differences based on the type of NEP. The positive effect of the overall proportion of citizens engaging in NEP seems to be driven by the conventional NEP, the NEP done by citizens who are satisfied with the way democracy works, and the NEP of citizens feeling the attachment to the democratic system. On the other hand, the protest NEP, the NEP of dissatisfied citizens and, the NEP of citizens less attached to the democratic system has no effect. The models point to the conclusion that not only the quantity of NEP, but also its quality is crucial. Having potentially active citizens is not enough and as the values of participants seem to be the key issue. Previous democratic education and civic attitudes of citizens' matter. The theoretical arguments about the effects of various types of NEP, e.g., protest or conventional, are also build around the expected values and attitudes of participants.

Table 2 - Results of hypothesis testing on the macro-level

Hypothesis		Impact of NEP on the government effectiveness
H1: The underlying affective values influence the government effectiveness.	✓	Model 2, 3: The number of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works has a positive impact on the government effectiveness. The number of dissatisfied citizens has no impact.
H1a: The level of non-electoral participation has no effect on the government effectiveness.	X	Model 3: The proportion of citizens engaging in NEP has a positive impact on the government effectiveness.
H2: The protest participation decreases the government effectiveness.		
H2a: The protest behavior is a form of elite-challenging action utilized mostly by citizens with post-material values. Therefore, protest does not represent a threat to democracy, quite contrary it increases the government effectiveness.	X	Model 4: The proportion of citizens engaging in the protest NEP has no impact on the government effectiveness.
H3: Non-electoral participation of citizens with democratic values has a positive impact on the government effectiveness.	✓	Model 5, 6: The NEP of citizens that are satisfied with the way democracy works and of citizens that agree with the ban of political parties that wish to overthrow democracy has a substantial positive and effect on government effectiveness.
The participation of citizens with non-democratic values has a negative impact.	X	Model 5, 6: The NEP of citizens that are dissatisfied with the way democracy works and of citizens that disagree with the ban of political parties that wish to overthrow democracy has no effect on government effectiveness.
<b>H4 (Empirical theory of democracy):</b> Overall, the NEP has either no impact or negative impact on the government effectiveness	X	The overall level of NEP, the specific types of NEP and the NEP of groups with varying democratic values has positive or no effect on governmental effectiveness.
<b>H5 (Strong democracy):</b> Overall, the NEP has a positive impact on the government effectiveness no matter the type.	X	The overall level of NEP has a positive effect on the governmental effectiveness. However, the type of the NEP matters and some types have no effect on governmental effectiveness.

The results suggest that democracies should be able to cope at least with the short-term surge in NEP and, in some cases, it should be beneficial. These findings are good news for strong democrats and should soothe worries based on the empirical theory of democracy. Not only can participation bring more effective government, but it is also possible to educate citizens through participation as their negative values do not seem to constitute an immediate threat to a democratic stability. One of the reasons might be that modern governments are more robust and have higher capacity to cope with complex demands of civil society. It is also possible that the changing patterns and amount of participation made societies more participatory. The apathy does not mix that clearly with the non-democratic values or dissatisfied attitudes as they did in the 1950s.

There are also some key limitations to the models in Chapter 4.2. All consider only linear relationships between variables and, most of them are the restricted fixed effects that utilize solely the variation within individual countries over time. The time-invariant factors such as culture or specific national institutions are not considered. The panel data used in the models are slightly unbalanced with a medium-N of cases. The listwise deletion would severely limit the power to test hypothesis. Future research should therefore utilize new data sources for new periods and consider imputation to address the issue of imbalance in panel. Another potential issue of the quantitative analysis is the construction of the dependent variable. The government effectiveness from the World Bank is perception based.<sup>2</sup> In the case of this dissertation this is less of a limitation as the perception has direct theoretical link to the concept of legitimacy and models are based on the within variation.

The last limit to the study is the potential endogeneity in the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness. The Introduction clearly stated that the theoretical relationship between NEP and government effectiveness goes causally both ways. On the theoretical level and analytical level is the reverse causal relationship addressed by Chapter 5.3.1. The models focus on the role of the perceived government responsiveness which is a crucial dimension of the government effectiveness. For some citizens serves the perceived government responsiveness as the motivation to participate. Such relationship is nevertheless problematic in the models of Chapter 4.2. Even though all the independent variables have been lagged by one year, doing so is no panacea for the endogeneity issue. Unfortunately, there does not seem

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<sup>2</sup> List of sources can be accessed through the World Bank. *Worldwide Governance Indicators – Government Effectiveness*; available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=ge.pdf>

to be a set of readymade instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity. Then, the viable solution is the detailed case study of the outliers. Spain after the economic crisis and the *Indignados* movement seem to be an ideal place where to start. Both the protest NEP and the number of dissatisfied citizens increased rapidly. Yet, it seems that they did not negatively influence the government effectiveness. This can of course be influenced by the nature of indicator and more future research is necessary.

Nevertheless, the main conclusion of the Chapter 4 is that the only the quantity of NEP, but also its quality is crucial. Having only potentially active citizens is not beneficial for the democracy. Still, the values of participants seem to be the key issue. Previous democratic education and civic attitudes of citizens' matter. Nevertheless, it seems that strong democrats can therefore escape the vicious circle of participation and educate the citizens towards the democratic and inclusive values through the process. This assumption holds only if there are no differences among individual groups regarding democratic values. If some groups only participate rarely or not at all, they cannot be educated through the process. They simply abstain and keep their values. The impact of NEP on the civic culture would be then limited, a preaching to the choir.

Therefore, Chapter 4 revealed the need for further analysis of the group differences in NEP based on the individual democratic values. The values of participants are also closely connected to the type of NEP as the theoretical arguments about the effects of various types of NEP, e.g., protest or conventional, are also build around the expected values and attitudes of participants. However, the relationship between values and participation cannot be addressed on the structural level. One simple survey question regarding the democratic values is not sufficient anymore, perhaps it never was. Democracy has multiple dimensions that need to be taken in account (see Quaranta, 2018; Schedler & Sarsfiel, 2007). The satisfaction with democracy thus might combine the specific support for the government with the diffuse support for the democratic system. Moreover, it is necessary to address the question of liberal rights that constitute a necessary ingredient of the contemporary inclusive liberal democracy.

Chapter 5 is therefore devoted to the elaborate study of the individual democratic values and their effect on the NEP based on the country specific dataset from the Czech Republic. Based on the theoretical assumptions of the deliberative democracy and the participatory democracy the models focus on the varying effect of the discussion within heterogeneous network and external efficacy i.e., the perceived responsiveness of government.

Table 3 - The characteristic of clusters

		<b>Democracy best system</b>	<b>Prefer recent system</b>	<b>Government respects dem. rights</b>	<b>Government protects minorities</b>	<b>Right of minorities to hold meetings</b>
Liberal democrats	N = 503 (39.24 %)	Hard democratic	Hard democratic	Hard liberal	Hard liberal	Hard liberal
Illiberal democrats	N = 319 (24.88 %)	Soft democratic	Soft democratic	Soft liberal	Soft illiberal	Hard liberal
Xenophobic democrats	N = 163 (12.71 %)	Soft democratic	Soft democratic	Soft liberal	Soft liberal	Soft illiberal
Liberal non- democrats	N = 297 (23.17 %)	Soft non- democratic	Soft non- democratic	Hard liberal	Hard liberal	Hard liberal
Total (mean)	N = 1282	Soft democratic	Soft democratic	Soft liberal	Soft liberal	Soft liberal

Individual theoretical quantiles are hard non-democratic (1st), soft non-democratic (2nd), soft democratic(3rd), and hard democratic(4th); hard illiberal (1st), soft illiberal (2nd), soft liberal (3rd), and hard liberal (4th) respectively.



Table 3 provides a closer look at the characteristic of individual groups. The result of clustering is a classification into four groups: liberal democrats (39.24%), illiberal democrats (24.88%), xenophobic democrats (12.71%) and liberal non-democrats (23.17%). Although on the surface the Czech population as a whole seems to be soft democratic and soft liberal, there are striking differences under the surface. The findings carry both positive and negative messages. The liberal democrats are only a minority in the Czech Republic. Still, they are the largest group. Furthermore, there is not a large group of illiberal non-democrats present, i.e., being non-democratic, illiberal, and xenophobic. Almost 77% of the citizens are part of the group with soft or hard pro-democratic orientation. Moreover, there are two groups present with the hard-liberal values both in theory and in practice. Together they also constitute a majority of citizens (62.41%). Three out of four groups would not limit right of minorities to hold meetings and together they form an overwhelming majority (87.29%).

Perhaps the most surprising finding is the fact that the non-democratic group blends the low support for democratic regime with the strong support for liberalism. The term liberal non-democrat itself sounds partly like an oxymoron. Nevertheless, this group is only “soft non-democratic,” i.e., they do not outright reject the democratic system. The mild skepticism about democracy might be given by the fact that they perceive democracy as an ineffective system incapable of providing prosperity and citizens’ rights to their full extent. Their understanding of democratic rights is most likely much broader than one the liberal democrats have; it might include the right to work promoted by communist regime etc. Such interpretation corresponds to the “losers of transformation” view. Yet, it does not result in illiberal non-democratic values.

Then, there are two groups with soft pro-democratic attachment mixed with some illiberal aspects. Their centroids are from all groups closest one to another. The illiberal democrats do not consider the government protection of minorities as a crucial aspect of democracy. However, they would not limit their rights and their position is clearly liberal in this aspect.<sup>3</sup> Their stance on democracy most likely corresponds to the Schumpeterian view of democracy and they limit the system to the free election. They do not stress the government protection of democratic rights either. Although, their mean value narrowly fits into the soft liberal quartile, they score the highest from all the groups

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<sup>3</sup> The alternative interpretation to the liberal values is the lack of interest in the topic. In other words, the citizens would not strongly defend liberal values but rather they do not care much about the rights of minorities and thus would not limit them.

The last group consists of the xenophobic democrats. The term might seem harsh. Yet they would severely restrict the right of various groups to hold public meetings. Most of the members would exclude between four to six minorities out of seven from public participation. (Mean = 5.14, SD = 1.30). They seem mildly interested in the liberal democracy and would limit the system to the majoritarian population. Their exclusionary view might again be caused by the fact that they perceive themselves as the losers of transformation. Therefore, they want to protect the few benefits of democracy from the outsiders.

The groups then entered multiple linear regression models which tested the association between position on democracy and NEP. First model tested the differences among groups (equivalent to ANOVA). The liberal democrats represent the base category for the comparison. The two mixed groups, i.e., illiberal democrats and xenophobic democrats, participate the least. This somewhat corresponds to the findings of Booth and Seligson (2009) that the mixed groups participate the least. It can be argued that the mixed understanding of democracy signals weak interest in politics and absence of strong opinions, perhaps besides the singular issue of minority rights. Thus, these groups are complacent with the process of voting. Yet, the difference might be given solely by the composition effect i.e., accumulation of citizens with low resources within these groups. Second model therefore adds the socio-economic variables. The differences in participation of illiberal democrats and xenophobic democrats in comparison to the liberal democrats remain. The effect size for the exclusionary democrats is lower and it seems that education and age play some role at the composition of this group.

Third model then adds other control variables which are not directly tied to the socio-economic status. They express personal networks and psychological resources. The two main variables of interest, i.e., Discussion within heterogeneous network and External Efficacy are included as well. The third model explains larger share of variance than the second model. The overall effect of education is also lower when the political interest and internal efficacy are included in the model. External efficacy is insignificant predictor for all the groups. The effect size of the membership in the xenophobic group is again reduced rendering the membership insignificant. Thus, it seems that the xenophobic values by themselves do not influence the amount of participation. The inactivity of the xenophobic group can be partly attributed to the composition of the group and based on the resource model these factors represent rather long-lasting effects. The illiberal democrats seem to be naturally less motivated to participate in line with the findings of Booth and Seligson (2009).

Another important finding is that the Liberal Non-democratic group does not significantly differ from the liberal democratic group. It seems that the Dahl's (1956) findings about the passivity of non-democratic citizens are not applicable to the case of the post-communist Czech Republic. Interpretation of these findings depends on the personal stance about the state of Czech democracy. It can be seen as the glass half full that the Liberal Democrats are the largest group and one of the two most active. On the other hand, the non-democratic participation constitutes a challenge for the legitimacy of young democracy in the Czech Republic. However, the non-democratic group mixes only soft non-democratic values with the hard preference for democratic rights. It is therefore crucial to explore under which conditions does the non-democratic participation increase as third model does not account for the varying effect of External Efficacy or Discussion among groups.


Last model therefore adds interaction terms for the liberal non-democrats. While the last model does not account for much more of the variation, it provides better insight into contextual effect of individual groups. The overall effect of External Efficacy in the third model was negligible, the fourth model shows quite a different picture. There is disordinal interaction present and the effect of External Efficacy varies based on the group membership. The effect of External Efficacy is positive for the non-democratic group ( $\beta = 0.174$ ), while being negative and insignificant for the rest ( $\beta = -0.055$ ).

The possible explanation is that for non-democratic groups the higher External Efficacy signifies the belief that someone listens in an otherwise unresponsive and illegitimate regime. The Czech non-democrats stress the democratic rights not the regime themselves. Thus, the responsive government motivates them to participate more. As they do not represent the dominant group, they might be lacking a key component to trigger participation, the group identification (Miller et al., 1981). The responsive government targeting non-democrats with its message might help them to feel like an included group. The findings go against Gamson's expectations of a political apathy in the presence of high trust. However, they are consistent with some findings about the higher efficacy levels found in authoritarian regimes (Zhou & Ou-Yang, 2017).

Further, Iyengar suggests that the external efficacy is boosted when the outcome of an election is in line with the citizen's preference. There is a reciprocal effect of electoral participation on the external efficacy as well (Finkel, 1985). Even though the effect is rather small, in the case of the non-democratic group it forms a possibility of a feedback loop. The results of the election might mobilize non-democrats to participate outside the electoral arena.

If the government does indeed listen to demands challenging the regime, it might be convinced that its message is overall well received and stress it further. Then, the external efficacy for the non-democratic group further increases and triggers an increase in participation. The result is a downward spiral of democratic legitimacy.

Figure 1 - Marginal effect of External Efficacy on NEP depending on the group membership




*Values of the linear prediction are based on Model 4; Figure plots differences based on the group membership and value of External Efficacy; values of other independent variables are in the linear prediction fixed at their means.*

Furthermore, there is a second disordinal interaction present in Model 4 (see Figure 2). The effect of discussion with opposition differs and the xenophobic group is indeed negatively influenced by the discussion within heterogeneous network. Therefore, the question is not whether confrontation encourages or discourages people from the future discussion (see Mutz, 2002; Eveland & Hively, 2009; Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). It is rather that some people are discouraged from the participation. The process described by Mutz (2002) fits the xenophobic group. The effect of discussion therefore holds up to some expectations about its prodemocratic influence. The deliberation tames the xenophobic attitudes and prevents from translating into broader society. On the other hand, these findings go against the core of deliberative democracy.

The main attributes of the deliberation are inclusiveness and equality. In the case of the xenophobic democrats, it seems that either of these cannot be achieved. Yet, the withdrawal from the participation might signify the educative function of deliberation. It is possible that the citizens will not be excluded forever and only need time to process their ambiguous values.

Figure 2 - Marginal effect of Discussion on NEP depending on the group membership



*Values of the linear prediction are based on Model 4; Figure plots differences based on the group membership and value of Discussion; values of other independent variables are in the linear prediction fixed at their means.*

To summarize, the first analytical part provided evidence in favor of the fact that the participation of non-democratic groups does not increase accountability of institutions. Instead, there are well-founded reasons to fear the participation of citizens without democratic values. The individual data analysis then explored under which conditions such participation occurs. The liberal non-democrats participate when they see that there is a responsive government present. On the contrary, the citizens with democratic values are growing complacent and participate less. The difference between the effect of the environment on democratic and non-democratic participation might explain the different paths new democracies take in building

state capacity and institutional accountability. Also, while it might seem that the role of parties has decreased in traditional democracies (see Mair, 2005): they influence the perceived responsiveness of government and play an important role of gatekeepers in new regimes. The question remains whether the situation of non-democratic participation together with the government perceived to be responsive to the non-democratic issues triggers the counteraction of other groups. It is also unclear whether this counteraction will be aimed on voting, i.e., changing the government, influencing it, i.e., NEP, or both.

The resounding conclusion of this dissertation is the need for the incorporation of the non-electoral participation into the contemporary theory of democracy. To do so it is necessary to consider the democratic values of both participants and non-participants. The values and attitudes of citizens shape how they participate and what are the effects of their actions on the democracy. For decades the theory of the strong democracy and the empirical theory of the democracy seemed to contradict one another in the role of non-electoral participation. The modernization of society, emergence of new values and changing patterns of participation seem to change this quarrel. A focus on the values of citizens can accommodate both approaches. It enables to utilize strengths of both theories while addressing their weaknesses. Together they form a complex theoretical background necessary for a future advancement in the contemporary theory of democracy.

The main contribution of this dissertation is that it relates the empirical tests to the overall democratic theory. The accumulation of sufficient evidence is the first step needed for the re-evaluation of any theory. However, the data utilized in the presented models also limit the generalizability of the conclusions. The macro-level findings are limited to the sample of European democracies. The effect of time invariant factors is not discussed, and other regions might behave differently. The country specific data for the Czech Republic from the 2014 also provide key insight into the role of context surrounding the non-electoral participation. However, the composition of the groups based on the individual democratic values of citizens might differ from country to country. Nevertheless, the presented research is merely a starting point for a new unified theory. The text provides inspiration for other authors and challenges them to follow with subsequent constructive critique.

## Author's Research Activities Related to the Dissertation

### Excerpts of the Chapter 1 published as

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## Abstrakt

Svobodné volby jsou nutnou ne však již dostačující podmínkou soudobé demokracie. S pokračující demokratizací, modernizací společnosti a šířením post-materiálních hodnot se stále rozšiřuje míra i role nevolební participace. Výzkum v posledních dekáдах podrobně zmapoval proměny v nevolební politické participaci i faktory ovlivňující, zda se do ní jednotliví občané zapojí či nikoliv. Díky tomu je možné poměrně přesně popsat rozdíly v míře nevolební participace mezi skupinami osob či mezi jednotlivými státy. Stále však nemáme odpověď na otázku, jaké mají tyto rozdíly dopad na demokracii. Soudobé teorie demokracie nenabízí jednotný pohled. Naopak nevolební participace je tím hlavním prvkem, kterým se odlišují. Někteří autoři ji vidí jako šanci na kvalitnější vládnutí, jiní se obávají ohrožení stability demokracie při masovém zapojení občanů. Skeptický pohled empirické teorie demokracie tak kritizuje participativní a deliberativní demokracie. Jedná se nicméně o přístupy budované ve 20. století, které již nemusí reflektovat současnou společnost. Proto je na místě zhodnocení platnosti některých původních předpokladů. Předkládaná práce nejprve zkoumá vztah mezi nevolební participací a vládní efektivitou na úrovni evropských států mezi roky 2002 a 2016. Hlavním závěrem je, že nevolební participace neohrožuje vládní efektivitu, naopak má většinou pozitivní dopad. Existují však zásadní rozdíly mezi jednotlivými druhy nevolební participace. Protestní chování nemá na vládní efektivitu dopad. Participace občanů spokojených s fungováním demokracie či s demokratickým přesvědčením má pozitivní efekt. Participace jejich protějšků však nemá efekt žádný. Rozdíly v dopadu nevolební participace na vládní efektivitu jsou tedy ve výsledku ovlivněny zejména hodnotami participujících občanů. Druhá analytická část práce proto na unikátních datech z České republiky zkoumá vztah mezi demokratickými hodnotami a nevolební participací na individuální úrovni občanů. Na základě klastrové analýzy je demonstrováno, že demokratické hodnoty se skládají z více dimenzí a občany nelze rozdělit pouze do dvou kategorií jako demokraty a nedemokraty. Data ukazují, že liberální demokraté v České republice převažují a patří mezi nejaktivnější občany, nejsou však kategorií většinovou. Zároveň některé prediktory participativního chování mohou mít zcela obrácený efekt v závislosti na demokratických hodnotách občana. Zatímco na většinu občanů má diskuse pozitivní vliv, demokraté s xenofobním přesvědčením jsou jí od participace odrazeni. Podobně pak subjektivní představa o tom, že vláda občanům naslouchá u většiny občanů nevolební participaci snižuje. Avšak vede k nárůstu participace u nedemokraticky přesvědčených občanů, kteří však v České republice mají současně i silně liberální preference.

Tato zjištění slouží jako základ pro lepší budoucí začlenění nevolební participace do teorie demokracie.

## Abstract

Although free elections are necessary for the liberal democracy, they are not the sufficient condition. On the other hand, the democratization, modernization of society and growing post-material values highlight the importance of the non-electoral participation. In the past three decades the research was focused on the changing nature of political participation and analyzed the predictors of non-electoral participation. Today, the academic literature provides a complex explanation for the differences among groups of people or even states. Yet, it is still not clear what these differences mean for the democracy. Contemporary theory of democracy is also full of contradictions when it comes to the role of non-electoral participation. In fact, the non-electoral participation is the defining issue that differentiates individual theories of democracy. Some scholars understand non-electoral participation as a chance for a better government. Others fear that mass participation might destabilize the democratic system instead. The empirical theory of democracy is the main source of the skepticism about the role of the non-electoral participation and as such it has been criticized by the participatory and deliberative democrats. Nevertheless, all these frameworks were built in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and they might not reflect the current state of the affairs and the old assumptions need to be re-evaluated. The dissertation first focuses on the relationship between non-electoral participation and government effectiveness on the sample consisting of the European democracies in between 2002 and 2016. The main finding is that the non-electoral participation does not threaten the government effectiveness. Quite contrary, it has mostly positive impact. However, there are key differences when it comes to the type of the non-electoral participation. The protest participation has null effect. The participation of citizens satisfied with the democratic system or citizens with the democratic preferences has a positive impact while there is no effect when it comes to their counterparts. The differences are then driven by the values of the participating citizens. Second portion of the analytic part is therefore devoted to the analysis of the individual data. Country specific data from the Czech Republic allow to closely examine the relationship between democratic values and participation. First, the cluster analysis helps to uncover the groups based on the multi-level nature of democracy. Simple question regarding democratic preference is not sufficient anymore for the analysis of a complex

phenomenon such as liberal democracy. The results show that liberal democrats are the most numerous groups and one of the most active. Yet, they do not constitute majority of citizens. Moreover, the OLS models with interactions enable to analyze varying effect of some predictors. While the discussion has a positive effect on most, it does discourage the xenophobic democrats from the participation. Similarly, the perceived government responsiveness has a negative impact on participation of non-democrats, who interestingly in the Czech Republic combine non-democratic preference with strong liberal values. All these findings will help to better incorporate non-electoral participation into the theory of democracy.