

**Palacký University Olomouc**  
**Faculty of Arts**  
**Department of Political Science and European Studies**

Ondřej Holaschke

**Analysis of the Czech Republic's Approach to De Facto States:  
Case Study – Taiwan and Northern Cyprus**  
**Analýza přístupu České republiky k de facto státům:  
Případová studie – Taiwan a Severní Kypr**

Bachelor's Thesis

**Research supervisor:** prof. Gökhan Bacik, Ph.D.

Olomouc 2024

I hereby declare that the submitted bachelor's thesis is the result of my own work with use of listed literature and sources.

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024 in Olomouc

Ondřej Holaschke

I would like to express gratitude to my research supervisor, prof. Gökhan Bacik, Ph.D. for his help and guidance during the creation of this thesis. I would also like to thank all the responders who agreed to be interviewed for the sake of research as well as allow their answers to be used in the thesis. Many thanks also to Mgr. Barbora Boráková, without whose advice I would sometimes be completely lost.

## Contents

<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>1. Defining a De facto State</b> .....	<b>8</b>
1.1. Taiwan as a de facto state .....	11
1.2. Northern Cyprus as a de facto state .....	14
<b>2. Czech Approach to the Subjects</b> .....	<b>19</b>
2.1. Czech Republic and the ROC .....	19
2.2. Czech Stance on the TRNC .....	22
<b>3. Practical Part: Hypotheses and Interviews</b> .....	<b>25</b>
3.1. Czech Republic and Taiwan – Money Is More Valuable Than Values .....	27
3.2. Czech-Taiwanese Relations and the Role of China .....	29
3.3. The Cold Czech (Dis)Connection with the TRNC .....	32
3.4. Role of the Subjects Being De Facto States .....	33
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>36</b>
<b>Literature</b> .....	<b>38</b>
<b>Appendix</b> .....	<b>42</b>
Interviews .....	42
<b>Abstract/Abstrakt</b> .....	<b>43</b>
Abstract .....	43
Key words: .....	43
Abstrakt .....	44
Klíčová slova: .....	44

## Introduction

In the global climate of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there is a series of entities that work in very similar ways as full-fledged states do, yet manage to do so without being recognised as legal state units. They work outside the conception of a state. They exist, but aren't recognised, not by the majority of the world, anyway. These entities have many attributes that a state possesses, but for reasons pertaining to their emergence or continuing existence do not possess any legitimacy awarded to them by the rest of the world. Experts divide the emergence of these de facto states alongside the creation of new countries into two waves: The first following the end of The Second World War and the crumbling of old empires and the second out of the culmination of the Cold War (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004). Both of these waves were the result of a vast change to the global status quo and resulted in the creation of new countries and de facto states.

Among the newly created countries were the People's Republic of China (further PRC or China) and its opponent the Republic of China (further ROC or Taiwan) as a result of the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949. Although at first considered the true China by the United Nations (further UN), the Republic of China later lost its status alongside its seat in the United Nations Security Council (further UNSC) and in the UN as a whole in 1971. Now the ROC, or Taiwan, remains as an individual entity, recognised by only few. Officially considered a part of the PRC it has managed to create its own standing as a silicone superpower with influence on the world economics with its gigantic integrated circuit and microchip industry.

Another country emerging from post-WW2 climate was the Republic of Cyprus (further RC or Cyprus), a former British colony with a strong population of Greeks and Turks, both groups wishing to be conjoined to their particular country of origin. Following a wave of nationalist uprisings resulted in Cyprus gaining independence in 1960 under the condition that it would not seek to be annexed by either Greece or Turkey. A careful balance was made to integrate both ethnics into the workings of the country, but over the years, the Greek Cypriots exerted more and more authority while slowly attempting to lay ground for joining with Greece. After a period of violent encounters and a coup by the Greek nationalists in 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied the northern part of the island, which was declared unilaterally in 1983 as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (further TRNC or Northern Cyprus). The TRNC is currently recognised only by its protector state – Turkey – and has become fully dependent on its support.

The focus of this thesis is to compare the approach the Czech Republic has taken towards both of these mentioned subjects and examine the reasons why it has taken such a stance in the first place. Many authors focusing on the problematics of de facto states still do not settle on a full definition, even on the term de facto state, often using other terms, such as quasi-state. The goal of the thesis lies in establishing working criteria that would, insert the subjects into said criteria, analyse. Afterwards it will analyse the position the Czech Republic has taken towards these subjects with the historical context since its establishment in 1993. Finally, it will compare answers of interview subjects picked for the research of this problematic to find the reasons why this approach was taken.

The topic of de facto states remains an actual one, with many others emerging in the post-Cold War world: Abkhazia, Ossetia or Somaliland just to name a few. Among these figures, the subjects used for this thesis are most prominent with the ROC standing as a special case among the other de facto states.

The objective of the thesis is to find an answer to several research questions: *Does the fact that Taiwan and Northern Cyprus are de facto states have any bearing on the Czech approach towards them?; Does the relations the Czech Republic has with the countries that claim the subjects as their own, ie. China and Cyprus, influence its position?; What role does the pragmatic approach play in comparison with the political in the Czech Republic's policy?* Towards this end it works with 4 total hypotheses: *The reason for the working relationship between the Czech Republic and Taiwan lies primarily in economic cooperation potential, not in proximity in values.; The Czech Republic's approach to the ROC is still heavily influenced by its relations with the PRC.; There is no advantageous potential in pursuing a better relationship with the TRNC.; The fact that both subjects are de facto states plays only a small, if any, role in the Czech approach to them.*

When approaching the hypotheses a specific approach must be taken into account. In this case it is analysis of official documents and interviews with several specialized individuals who can bring insight into the topic and give answers needed to confirm or reject the hypotheses: representatives of the political and academic spheres. The political figures include Members of the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic, a Member of the European Parliament and Officers employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, from the Department for Asia and the Department for South and South-East Europe respectively.

The thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first one, the aforementioned requirements for an entity to be categorised as a de facto state will be established by taking into account positions of various scholars, beginning with the foundations laid by Barry Bartmann and Scott Pegg. In this case they will be: Persistence over time, Territorial control, Functioning governance and Limited, but working sovereignty. Afterwards it will be described how each of the subjects researched for the thesis, ie. the ROC and TRNC, fulfil these requirements by taking into account these entities' history, current position, factual workings of their local institutions – legislative, executive and judicial powers – and finally their position in the international community. Finally, the chapter will determine whether or not these entities are truly de facto states within the parameters set.

The second chapter will then analyse the interactions that have taken place between the subjects and the Czech Republic leading up to the time of writing in a historical context and put them into context with the hypotheses. The chapter will be divided into two parts, each describing the evolution of the interactions and relations, or lack thereof, that the Czech Republic had with the subjects, setting the ground for the final chapter.

The third chapter – the practical part – will be the culmination of the research. The beginning will at first introduce the individual respondents to the interviews and the process of selection. Afterwards it will put forth the hypotheses of the thesis and explain the reasoning behind why these hypotheses were made. Following will be four subchapters, each focusing in detail on one hypothesis, at first paraphrasing the responses of the interviewees and later comparing them to reach a consecutive conclusion on whether the hypotheses have been confirmed or rejected.

The thesis is made using literary research of texts made by experts on the topic of de facto states, individual history and inner machinations of both Taiwan and Northern Cyprus, their interactions with the outside world and later with answers to question asked within interviews with qualified members within the political and academic scene of the Czech Republic. The results of the thesis are then summarized in the final conclusion.

# 1. Defining a De facto State

This chapter focuses on the definition of a de facto state according to the findings of academics and assess the way both subjects fit into it. The chapter will first establish the term de facto state and specify the conditions a subject must fulfil to be considered a de facto state – namely persistence, territorial control, governance and limited recognition. In the following parts, these conditions will be applied on the selected subjects – Taiwan and Northern Cyprus – to confirm if and why they can be considered de facto states.

McGarry describes de facto states as “regions which carry out the normal functions of the state on their territory and which are generally supported by significant proportions of their population.” (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004). They are seceded parts of a state that are not recognised by the international community, which instead prefers to consider them as parts of the country from which they originated. There were two waves of new countries emerging with a series of de facto states; one after the end of World War II with the fall of colonial empires and establishment of new forces and a second large spring of these states has appeared during the 1990s after the breakup of the Soviet Union and a change in dynamics in the post-Cold War world (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004)<sup>1</sup>. The former led to the creation of the Republic of China, and later to the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In case of de facto states, one must necessarily mention the countries that claim dominion over the aforementioned subjects, in this case The People’s Republic of China, and The Republic of Cyprus, respectively. Although, neither of these countries has any actual power in the de facto states, one could even say, that the seceded regions function despite the best efforts of their origin state, the international community treats them as if they are fully controlled by said countries.

A de facto state must fulfil several requirements (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004) to be classified as such:

---

<sup>1</sup> One of the most complete combinations of what entities can and were classified as de facto states was compiled by Adrian Florea in 2014. (Florea, 2014)

- 1) Persistence Over Time: The de facto state exists for a period of time as its own unit without impediment.
- 2) Control of Territory: The de facto state holds direct and tangible control over a defined geographic area. This control may rise from historical, geopolitical or ethnic factors, which lay a basis for establishing functioning governance.
- 3) Autonomous Governance: De facto states possess working governance structures in executive, legislative and judicial areas, which function similarly, sometimes identically to those of recognised states, as well as a drafted constitution. However, these institutions' legitimacy is contested, as it is held back by the lack of recognition.
- 4) Unrecognized, yet working sovereignty: De facto states struggle to gain international recognition and wish to achieve the status of a recognised state. The lack thereof often limits the capacities of the de facto states to engage in global forums and countries which do not recognise them must tread lightly while engaging in dealings with them. The abilities of de facto stage to establish formal diplomatic relations, access international institutions and negotiate any formal documents or treaties with recognised countries as they themselves have no legitimate diplomatic institutions to make these contacts.

Kolstø (Kolstø, 2006) discusses similar criteria with the exception of government bodies and states that the de facto state must persist for at least 2 years. Despite his work compiling terms such as quasi-states, de facto states, etc. it is obvious he puts both ROC and TRNC in the same group. Where his ideas differentiate are within the parameters of external patronage from an established state. In the case of the TRNC, it is obviously Turkey, being the only country that openly recognises Northern Cyprus as a state and is its primary economic partner to such a measure, the TRNC is basically dependent on Turkey's support. In the case of Taiwan, Kolstø mentions the USA as the patron state, but this is where two important conditions come to mind. Economically, the ROC is not dependent on the support of the United States, as it has an established

economy as the largest global producer of semi-conducts and integrated circuits, making it effectively a silicone superpower and it engages in this trade even with its own primary opponent, China, who has been Taiwan's strongest trade partner since *year*. Second, the patron state in Kolstø's cases almost always recognises, or is on the road to recognise, the de facto state, aside from Turkey in the case of Northern Cyprus, he mentions Russia in the cases of Abkhazia<sup>2</sup>, South Ossetia<sup>3</sup> and Transnistria<sup>4</sup> (Kolstø, 2006), or Armenia in the case of now dissolved Republic of Artsakh<sup>5</sup>. The USA have supported the ROC since they stopped recognising it in 1979. Since then, neither they, nor any other states that engage in relations with Taiwan, including the Czech Republic, have shown any intention of recognising it. There is a number of other de facto states who survive without the existence of a patron state. Dembinská and Campana (Dembinská & Campana, 2017) name Cabinda<sup>6</sup> and Somaliland<sup>7</sup> as such examples.

Existence of a patron state has been shown as not necessary for the existence of a de facto state, proven also by the fact that one of the subjects defies this expectation. This perspective also proposes to view the de facto states as underlings in a sponsor-client relation (Dembinská & Campana, 2017), rather than their own individual entities. As such, this condition is discarded as a necessity for this research.

Others (Ker-Lindsay & Berg, 2011) state similar conditions as Bartmann, only adding that the territorial control is connected with military presence. This proves true in the case of both subjects. The TRNC's own forces, alongside the Turkish military force present on the island, being one of the main factors for the TRNC's survival to this date. In the case of Taiwan, the military is an important part of the ROC's policies, living under the constant threat of a possible invasion by the PRC, with current and past administrations always stating their plans of reunifying Taiwan with China (BBC, 2023). However, this still falls under the category of territorial control.

There was a question whether the type of regime plays a role in the treatment of a de facto state, whether it is easier to engage in relations with a democracy than another, more authoritarian

---

<sup>2</sup> De facto state claimed by Georgia, emerged in 1992

<sup>3</sup> De facto state claimed by Georgia, emerged in 1990

<sup>4</sup> De facto state claimed by Moldova, emerged in 1991

<sup>5</sup> De facto state claimed by Azerbaijan, emerged in 1991, dissolved in 2023

<sup>6</sup> De facto state claimed by Angola, emerged in 1975

<sup>7</sup> De facto state claimed by Somalia, emerged in 1991

type of government. However, it was proven irrelevant, relying more on individual needs and interests of the individual countries (Özpek, 2014).

From the analysis of other scholars, the four primary conditions set in the beginning of the chapter are ample criteria for defining a de facto state and determining whether or not the two subjects could indeed be labeled so. The following sub-chapters will analyse how both Taiwan and Northern Cyprus fulfill each condition.

### **1.1. Taiwan as a de facto state**

To understand the position of the ROC in the current climate, we must look to its roots. Taiwan as it exists today rose out of a remnant of the regime that used to rule China before Mao and the communists took over. Following these events and in light of the ongoing Chinese Civil War, The ROC, as we know it today, emerged as a succession nationalist government of China under Chiang Kai-Shek, who led his supporters and evacuated his government to Taiwan after the loss of ground in the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist and Communist forces. On 1<sup>st</sup> October 1949, the Communist Party of China declared the PRC and pushed Chiang's forces out of the mainland resulting in a declaration of a temporary capital city in Taipei on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1949. Following this, he turned Taiwan into a fortress, declaring martial law that lasted until 1987. This period is known by the locals as White Terror (Chen, 2008). The Kuonmintang (further KMT), ROC's ruling party, officially claimed that this was introduced to protect Taiwan from the influence of the PRC and communist sympathizers.

The threat of an attack from the PRC was still present as, although Mao Ze-Dong was at the time consolidating power and rebuilding his country after the war, his intentions of reclaiming Taiwan and reunifying China into its former glory were outspoken to say the least. After the start of the Korean war, USA under President Harry Truman, dispatched the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, fearing Mao may use the circumstances to try and reclaim the lost islands, as well as start to send them military and financial aid. After the Korean war ended, the US passed the Formosa Resolution which would promise a great amount of aid to the ROC until 1965 (US Congress Resolution 159, 1955), which arguably helped stabilise the control Chiang had over Taiwan, due to lowering of inflation and prices.

Both Chinas claimed rule over the territory controlled by their enemy. The Cold War at its

height resulted in the USA and its allies to recognise the ROC as the true government of China, while the USSR and its companions stood firmly behind Mao and the PRC. However, on 25<sup>th</sup> October 1971, the United Nations passed a resolution which recognised the PRC as the only legitimate government of China. The ROC lost its chair on the UN Security Council in favour of its communist opponent and many countries gradually recognised the PRC, established diplomatic relations and cut off from the ROC, leaving it in the position of a de facto state. The only reason for its continuous support would be its open opposition to the PRC (Chen, 2008).

In regards to territory, the ROC currently controls in total 168 islands, the main seat residing on the island of Taiwan. The territory is claimed by the PRC since the establishment of the declaration of ROC as a separate entity, just as the ROC claimed the territory held by the PRC today, and the two subjects have been proclaiming themselves as the “One True China” for a time, while currently the ROC’s rhetoric has changed to being an independent state and aiming to gain a sovereignty (Dittmer, 2004). The PRC has not made any move to pursue their claim over the lands held by the ROC and the current status quo has no indication of changing, due to the situation in the Taiwan strait. The ROC, same as the PRC claims the majority of the South China Sea, with many islands within being a subject of contest between the two, as well as other countries within the area, namely Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam. The area has been a subject of debate for years now and is nowhere near being solved (Chen, 2008).

The ROC has its own functioning bodies since 1947, which are divided into 5 Yuans – Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Control and Examination. (ROC Constitution, 1947) The Executive Yuan consists of the President, who along with the Vice-President is elected directly for a term of four years, maximum of 2 times, and selects the Premier and cabinet ministers who do not have to be approved by the Legislative Yuan. (ROC Constitution, 1947) The Legislative Yuan is a unicameral parliament with 113 seats, working through a mixed election system, making it the primary body to propose and pass laws. (ROC Constitution, 1947) The Judicial Yuan holds the power to interpret the constitution and other legislation. It is divided into sections, the highest standing being the Supreme Court with a separate Constitutional Court established to handle the issues concerning the constitution of the ROC (ROC Constitution, 1947).

The ROC’s Constitution is a document originating before the division, in 1947, and being continuously reformed throughout the whole course of the ROC’s existence as a separate entity

from the PRC. First there was a period where the KMT's single-party rule was ensured in the name of Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion, with the KMT ensuring the existence of martial law until 1987 and creating horrible conditions for any kind of political opposition, until they were finally repealed fully in 1991. During the 1990s a period of reforms began, slowly introducing multi-party democratic elements into the system, with the final amendments coming in 2005. The current constitution is an amended version of the one adopted in 1947 and is a strong issue in the debate of the RoC's status, with sections of the pro-independence side seeing it as a relic of the old times, due to its origins back in the time the RoC still held control over a portion of the Chinese mainland and the complicated history of the KMT's rule. However, as of today, the RoC's constitution is accepted as a basic law by the entire political scene of the RoC.

Concerning sovereignty, Taiwan could be called the most established de facto state in the world (Pegg, 2019). Due to its longer history and a period during which it was actually recognised by a part of the global community as the legitimate government of China, the ground for diplomacy has been laid before the near global adoption of The One China Policy and the PRC being recognised by the world during the Cold War as the rep. As of today, there are only 12 sovereign states that recognise and have full diplomatic relations with the RoC (Reuters, 2024), none of which are major players on the military or economic categories. The RoC does have limited, non-diplomatic relations with 59 sovereign states, the European Union, 3 territories (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 2023), 2 of which, Hong Kong and Macau, are under the official rule of the PRC, although with special dispensations due to their history and position – both regions having established relations within the Chinese “One Country, Two Systems” Policy (So, 2011) - and one de facto state, Somaliland. These subjects are usually working with the RoC through representative offices in said states that have their own equivalents in Taiwan, working as de facto embassies. 123 sovereign states have no relations that would resemble any form of diplomacy with the RoC, and the PRC makes a large effort to exclude the RoC from any platform they could possibly participate in, including the UN (Drun & Glasser, 2022).

In conclusion, the RoC fulfils all the conditions set out to define it as a de facto state. It possesses control over its territory, a functioning governance, has limited relations and almost no recognition on the global field and a sustainable economy and military. Despite its special origins, Taiwan can be considered a de facto state (Pegg, 2019).

## 1.2. Northern Cyprus as a de facto state

The TRNC is a self-declared state that emerged from the 1974 conflict that took place on the island of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. The island has a large population of both Greeks and Turks and its independence from the UK in 1960 was underlined by a promise of neither group seeking unification with either of the mentioned states<sup>8</sup>, signified in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The RC was founded on a notion that both ethnicities would work together to ensure peaceful coexistence. The seats in the parliament would be divided between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, each group electing a President and Vice-President respectively (Constitution of Cyprus, 1960). A disagreement slowly brewed between the two ethnic groups, when in 1963, 13 amendments to the constitution presented by then president Makarios III., would change the whole dynamic in favour of the Greeks, while making the Turks a minority in the country, which was followed by the Supreme Court denouncing the amendments as unconstitutional, and subsequently led to the Supreme Court being dissolved (Bebler, 2015). Tensions in Cyprus rose to an all-out conflict. Makarios wanted to lay a foundation for a strategy to pacify any possible resistance from the Turks, fast and with violence, before any other foreign power had the time to intervene. This process however, took too long, with the Cypriot national guard, supported by Greece, punishing the Turkish portion of the population, who barricaded in armed enclaves around Cyprus where they stayed for 11 years, divided by a UN buffer zone named The Green Line (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004).

In 1974, on the 15<sup>th</sup> July a Greek-supported military coup was carried out by the national guard, replacing Makarios' government with a pro-Enosis group and declaring the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus 5 days later, on the 20<sup>th</sup>, declaring the coup to be a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey quickly took over the northern part of the island and in August declared the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration which a year later turned into the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (further TFSC), presented as a step towards creating a unified federalized state in Cyprus, with the intention the Greek section would do the same, creating two equal units inside one state (Safty, 2011). This notion was rejected both by the RC and the UN who stated their "concern for the continuation of the crisis on Cyprus" and their

---

<sup>8</sup> Enosis – Unification with Greece, Taksim – Unification with Turkey

“regrets (over) the unilateral decision declaring a Federated Turkish State.”, instead stressing the “necessity to find a solution respecting the sovereignty” of the RC (UNSC Resolution 367, 1975). The TFSC remained as a placeholder for 8 years, until on 15<sup>th</sup> November 1983, the TRNC was declared as an independent state.

The global community tried to reunite Cyprus, spearheaded by the RC itself. The newly formed TRNC found support from the country that allowed them to separate in the first place, Turkey (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004). The power of government over the TRNC was held by the National Unity Party (further UBP) headed by the man at the head of the Turkish Cypriot independence movement – Rauf Denктаş. Denктаş, the former Vice president of Cyprus, became the first president of both the TFSC and later the TRNC, serving as the head of the Turkish Cypriots for a total of 32 years<sup>9</sup>. The UBP’s policies focus on either keeping the TRNC independent or making the RC a federative state (Bahcheli & Noel, 2010). It remains the strongest party in Northern Cyprus.

There have been many efforts for the reunification of Cyprus, the most famous being the Annan plan: An initiative named after the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. First proposed in 1999, with the intention of offering both sides of the conflict enough to accept a possible solution for their dispute (Nugent, 2000). Meanwhile, the RC earned a membership in the EU in 2000, despite its divided state, adding to its list of allies the powerful economic force. The initiative was seen as a possibility to bring Cyprus together again. The possibility of using the many advantages offered by membership in the EU could serve as a strong enough motivation to bring the Turkish Cypriots back into the fold (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004).

The United Nations issued a formal invitation to presidents of both parts of Cyprus, who met for the first time in Nicosia on 4<sup>th</sup> December 2001 starting a series of discussions and negotiations with the goal of creating conditions for a reunification of the island under the mediation of Álvaro de Soto, UN’s Special Advisor on Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots pushed for a unitary solution or a strong federative power, Turks for a federation granting greater powers to state institutions, with distinct opinions on land division, representation and political form. A large question was that of Turkish settlers that came to Northern Cyprus during the division (Hansen &

---

<sup>9</sup> 1973-74 VP of Cyprus, 1975-1983 president of TFSC, 1983-2005 president of TRNC.

Stepputat, 2005). While RC considered them a factor threatening the demography of the country, TRNC saw them as citizens and called their potential expulsion a breach of rights (Sözen & Özersay, 2006). Based on the preliminary meetings, de Soto presented the first version of the Annan plan to both sides. The first edition of the plan was sent back for revisions without any negotiations between the two parties occurring. The second version was published two days before the EC Copenhagen Summit 2002, where the joining of Cyprus was confirmed by the Union, as well as addressing the hopes for a unified Cyprus, stressing that the northern part could be exempt, if they do not rejoin. To further motivate the parties, it was stated that Turkey would not be allowed to join the EU until the Cyprus issue was solved (Casaglia, 2019). The second version was unsuccessful, both sides finding many flaws with its form, but some success was achieved, as both parties met for negotiation over Plan II. A 3<sup>rd</sup> edition was composed in February 2003, this one being returned by TRNC stating the plan is too disadvantageous for Northern Cyprus to be voted on (Sözen & Özersay, 2006).

On 1<sup>st</sup> May 2004, Cyprus was to join the EU alongside a new wave of members, including the Czech Republic. Despite not succeeding before its membership was agreed in 2002, Annan still hoped to create a settlement before this day would come. The failure of the 3<sup>rd</sup> plan was seen as definitive for a moment, but there was a change of leadership in TRNC, a coalition of parties with strong pro-Annan plan policies gaining majority in the parliament, while in RC, president Papadopoulos replaced. Meanwhile, in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became PM. When it came to Cyprus, it seemed that he would prefer a solution that would pave the way to Turkey's eventual joining the EU, rather than supporting the TRNC in its current state (Kolstø, 2006, p. 738). New leaders meant new space for negotiation.

A 4<sup>th</sup> edition was proposed, negotiations of it divided into 3 phases: First a negotiation between the delegations of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus in Nicosia to outline the plan under the supervision of Kofi Annan, afterwards including voices from Greece and Turkey and finally creating a definitive version of the text which could be submitted to a referendum in both regions. The negotiations were complicated by the TRNC and alongside this, Erdogan's government proposed 11 changing points a week before the plan was supposed to be finished, 9 of which were accepted, including Turkey's unilateral right to military intervention (Sözen & Özersay, 2006).

The final 5<sup>th</sup> version of the Annan plan proposed, among others, the following: "A United

Cyprus Republic, comprising of a bi-zonal structure of a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent states.” It was obvious that many demands of TRNC were agreed on (Bouris & Kyris, 2017). The 5<sup>th</sup> plan was seen as heavily in favour of Northern Cyprus and Turkey (Sözen & Özersay, 2006). The results of the referendum about the Annan plan reflect this: TRNC - 64,9% YES. RC – 75,8% NO (Assmussen, 2004).

When it comes to control of territory, Northern Cyprus has a hold on the northern part of the island of Cyprus, effectively one third of the entire landmass, divided into six administrative districts, twelve subdistricts and twenty-eight city municipalities. Despite the land being contested as rightfully being part of the RC, the control is held by the military forces of Northern Cyprus, supported by the Turkish military (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004).

The TRNC is a semi-presidential republic, with a working government, parliament and judiciary. The executive power is held by the president, elected for a 5-year mandate in a 2-round majority-based elections. The president appoints a PM based on the results of the parliament elections, who in turn appoints a Council of Ministers who form the main part of the executive branch, but also possess the ability to propose legislative documents. Despite the PM being the head of government, the president has the right to chair the Council, although without taking direct part in voting (Constitution of the TRNC, 1983). The legislative is represented by the Assembly of the Republic, a unicameral parliament with 50 seats based on a multi-party proportional system with a threshold of 5 %. The Assembly has the right to issue a vote of no confidence towards the government. If the Assembly cannot form a government, or if three consecutive Councils receive a no confidence vote, the president has the right to dismiss the Assembly and call new elections (Constitution of the TRNC, 1983). The judiciary of TRNC is a set of courts divided into branches focusing on different areas of the law. The highest institution is the Supreme Court which handles all last instances of law (Constitution of the TRNC, 1983). Judges are appointed by the president. Despite having a relatively strong parliament, the president plays the primary role in the running of Northern Cyprus with the constitution stating he may only be removed from office after being accused of high treason by two thirds of the Assembly.

Only one country in the world recognises Northern Cyprus as an independent state: Turkey. Due to its support in the creation of the state, as well as being still present in its workings, most of the world considers Northern Cyprus a territory occupied by Turkey, which rightfully belongs to

the RC (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004). The UN has stated several times that the declaration of independence from the TRNC as unlawful and invalid (UNSC Resolution 550, 1984). Since Cyprus is a member of the EU despite its divided state, the division remains a strong topic in the organisation being stated as one of the primary issues in the debate for the joining of Turkey. Despite this, TRNC representatives are observers in many organisations, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or Economic Cooperation Organisation. The Organisation of Islamic Co-Operation has accepted the TRNC as a full constituent state in 2004. In November 2022, the TRNC joined, as an observer, the Organisation of Turkic States.

The TRNC is a de facto state. There are many factors indicating that the TRNC is a puppet state of Turkey (Kolstø, 2006). Turkey's involvement was also one of the factors leading to the Annan plan's failure (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004). However, the role Turkey plays fits more an alliance of necessity, as the Cyprus issue still remains an obstacle for Turkey's long-time goal: EU membership.

## **2. Czech Approach to the Subjects**

This chapter focuses on the approach of the Czech Republic to each of the subjects respectively. The first part will focus on the description of the relations between Taiwan and the Czech Republic from its forming in 1993 up until the time of writing, ie. 2024. The second will describe the lack of individual contact of the Czech Republic with Northern Cyprus and compare how, or if, the Czech position differs in any way from the united front of integrations the Czech Republic is part of, namely the EU and NATO.

### **2.1. Czech Republic and the ROC**

The relations between the Czech Republic and ROC have changed significantly over the years. As a former communist state, during the Cold War, Czechoslovakia was in line with the rest of the bloc and recognised the PRC as the true China since the division (Song, 2018). It hasn't changed it after the implementation of the global One China policy and the division of Czechoslovakia. However, as the years passed, the Czech Republic moved closer to Taiwan and is currently one of the European countries with the warmest approach alongside Lithuania.

In the 1990s, the ROC made an attempt to approach post-communist countries in Central Europe in search of economic partners and perhaps even diplomatic allies. The climate was agreeable – the communist bloc was falling apart since 1989, the USSR had made it clear they would not intervene, the PRC was in an unfavourable light as an ally and the newly-formed democratic countries were in need of economic partners after opening themselves to the rest of the world (Tubilewicz, 2007). Czechoslovakia and later Czech Republic was among the states selected for this attempt.

After first promising attempts with Hungary and East Germany, negotiations were opened with Czechoslovakia. President Václav Havel, ex-dissident persecuted during the former communist regime, was very vocal about his disdain of the PRC's policies, inviting the Dalai Lama into Prague as well as Chinese democratic activists (Song, 2018). Sensing the opportunity, ROC foreign minister Lien Chan arrived in Prague, officially on a private visit. Unofficially, he was meant to investigate possible conditions for relations. This notion was supported by Czech First Lady Olga Havlová visiting Taiwan in December 1990, meeting with President Lee Teng-hui and

Foreign Minister Fred Chien<sup>10</sup>, becoming the first spouse of a head of state to conduct a visit to Taiwan (Tubilewicz, 2007). All was set for opening a Taipei Economic and Cultural Office which would work with diplomatic representatives. The Office would be established in December 1991.

After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the newly created Czech Republic continued in its efforts to establish a level of relations with the ROC and in November opened The Czech Economic and Cultural Office Taipei, first such institution from a post-Communist European state. In 1994 the Czech Republic spoke in support of ROC joining the UN as well as signing a WTO agreement. Lien, now Premier, visited Czech Republic and met with Czech PM Václav Klaus. The meeting was informal, took place outside official spaces and there are no recordings about what was said there (Tubilewicz, 2007). Still, the Czech supportive approach was noticed and in July 1995 at a conference in Switzerland, ROC Economics Minister Chiang and Klaus agreed on a joint economic initiative to support trade between their respective lands.

Václav Havel took the interest even further. At the UN 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations in October 1995, he acknowledged the existence of two Chinas and stated regrets over the ROC not having representation in the institution as a democratic country (Havel, 1995). This clashed with the government perspective, who were forced to do damage control, reassuring the PRC that the Czech Republic still adheres to the One-China policy (Fürst, 2007). This would become a recurring phenomenon in Czech dealings with both ROC and PRC. However, the support for Taiwan's joining the UN would remain, although hidden in a proclamation that any willing nation should be able to join.

The PRC noticed Taiwan's efforts to gain ground in Central Europe. Despite not officially reprimanding the individual states, they made it clear that for the good relations between them and China to continue, any public support of the ROC, or even the notion of there being two Chinas, were unimaginable (Song, 2018).

Potential cooperation was moved aside in favour of the larger and more lucrative Chinese market. The PRC offered a large advantage as a trade partner with fewer risks, while open support

---

<sup>10</sup> Lien became Governor of Taiwan Province 16<sup>th</sup> June 1990.

of the ROC could result in the Czech Republic facing repercussions threatening their economy (Song, 2018). Although not as strong as today, the PRC's economic reach was vast and angering them could result in unfortunate consequences. As such, Havel was, in his own words "pressured by elements in Prague to complicate issues with Taiwan" (Tubilewicz, 2007), as well as calm his comments regarding Tibet. However, he continued to be a vocal supporter of the ROC rejoining the UN (Tubilewicz, 2007).

Havel's efforts, despite honourable, had no results. The position of president in the Czech Republic is symbolic and has few actual powers which cannot be overridden by the parliament (Constitution of the Czech Republic, 1993). Any of his public declarations remained only that, declarations, with not many. The government's policies were clear. Good relations with the PRC held precedence and relations with Taiwan would remain on an economic level (Kowalski & Nolan, Gerrits (ed.), 2017).

Following the end of Havel's presidency and Václav Klaus' taking the presidential office, the relations with Taiwan could be called lukewarm. Despite economic agreements and cooperation, it was clear to Prague that any movement towards better relations with ROC risked a strong reaction from Beijing. China's economic reach is vast, connected to the entirety of the world. The worst-case scenario was that any country who got too close to provoke them could get blacklisted (Tubilewicz, 2007).

Miloš Zeman took office as President in 2013. A former PM and a man with rich history in Czech politics, Zeman stated his vocal public support of the PRC and its regime. A controversial public figure, Zeman was often criticised by other politicians for his warm approach to China, as well as Russia (Kowalski, 2022). In 2020, Senate Chairman Jaroslav Kubera publicly announced his intentions of visiting ROC as a state official, garnering large criticisms from the PRC and Zeman himself, who served Kubera a "threatening letter" from the Chinese embassy as well as the Office of the President (Šebeňa & Turcsányi, 2021).

Kubera's sudden death in January put a halt to the intentions, but the visit was indeed carried out by his successor Miloš Vystrčil in June, once again earning the protests of both the PRC who

called the visit an interference in Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity (Nechvátalová, 2020). Vystrčil still went and met with many head representatives of the ROC: President, Premier, Foreign Minister and Head of the Legislative Yuan. He also became the first foreign public official to hold a speech in the Legislative Yuan in 45 years and he finished it by paraphrasing J.F. Kennedy's Berlin 1963 speech with the words: "I am Taiwanese" (Český rozhlas, 2020).

Zeman's successor in the office, Petr Pavel, also made a mark on Czech-Taiwanese relations. After his election he received a congratulatory phone call from ROC President Tsai which lasted 15 minutes, and it was the first such call with an elected European head of state. Both stressed the shared values of their countries and hopes towards future cooperation. Pavel stated his own hopes of visiting Taiwan personally one day. He later added that he does not dispute the idea of One China, but would remind of the addendum: "One China, Two Systems." (Český rozhlas, 2023).

Vystrčil's visit also opened a new wave of communication between Czech Republic and the ROC. After him, Markéta Pekarová Adamová, Chairwoman of the House of Representatives, made a visit to the ROC in March 2023, meeting the President and Premier. The visit ended with a significant gesture, a declaration of inter-parliamentary cooperation, signed by Pekarová Adamová signifying a possible positive future development (Taipei Times, 2023).

Following the controversy of the visits and the phone call, Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala announced his intention to visit Beijing. The visit has not yet taken place at the time of writing.

## **2.2. Czech Stance on the TRNC**

There have been few interactions between the Czech Republic and the TRNC on an individual level. In most parts, they were within group initiatives from integrations the Czech Republic is a part of. The first major interaction came during the Czech joining of the EU, as it was in the same group of countries entering the Union as the RC (Casaglia, 2019). The intention of course being that the island would enter the EU as one unit and the conflict would be solved before the fateful date. That did not come to pass and Cyprus entered the Union in a divided state with the Northern part exempt (Sözen & Özersay, 2006).

The EU still holds hope that one day, a successful resolution will come to the Cyprus issue. As such, it wished to lay groundwork for future cooperation when the Northern part would be integrated into the Union, either rejoining the RC, or if the state would be reconstructed as a federation. Due to the conditions of Cyprus joining the Union, European Law and trade is not implemented beyond the Green Line. The European Commission proposed an extra trade deal with the TRNC, which the Czech Republic, alongside many, supported. The motion was tanked by the RC, now an EU member, who stated that any such agreement could be perceived as recognition of the TRNC (Bouris & Kyris, 2017). Due to issues with the legality and sovereignty of the TRNC government, any agreement signed by it is not considered legally binding (Bouris & Kyris, 2017).

It needs to be stated that the EU efforts were made in hope that cooperation with the TRNC might lead to reunification. It was never intended as a sign of recognition of the de facto state. Due to the questionable future of the reunification, no specific model was created for the intended Europeanisation of TRNC and any effort in including the TRNC through a process of incomplete integration is flawed and doomed to fail (Bouris & Kyris, 2017). Casaglia claims the TRNC to be in the middle of the EU efforts. *“Territorially it is a member state (de jure)”* (Casaglia, 2019) as it is internationally considered a part of Cyprus. However, politically it remains a *“prospective candidate (non-)state”* (Casaglia, 2019).

An important factor in these negotiations lies in the Turkish influence. The Cyprus issue still plays a large obstacle in its potential joining the EU. The TRNC’s dependence on Turkey for support results in them being bound to follow its will, or face ramifications in case of defiance. Reports speak of either lowering economic income, or even going so far as to turn off water. It is a stalemate for the two sides and in the TRNC is caught in the middle. Unable to move towards either direction, as the final goal of the EU is to achieve reunification on some level. The TRNC’s options in this are limited. (Bouris & Kyris, 2017) As mentioned before, its illegitimacy on the international field which stands behind the ROC and need for Turkey’s support conditioned by obedience leave it in a position where it cannot go either way. The EU is unwilling to compromise its current member state in favour of a part of land that they officially recognise as a part of said member. And Turkey will not release its hold, as the Cyprus dispute is now no longer the only issue standing in its intention to join the EU.

The Czech Republic was also part of the clash between NATO and EU on the topic of Cyprus, as a member of both integrations. The 1998 St. Malo Declaration and following 2002 Berlin Plus Agreement allowed the EU access to NATO's resources to allow greater cooperation between the two groups, since they shared a total of 22 members. However, further use of means requires consensus and the Cyprus issue became a roadblock in the conversation (Kolstø, 2006). As such, from 2004, diplomatic cooperation on an ambassadorial level only occurs in issues which arose before Cyprus joined the Union. Thus, the EU can no longer access NATO's assets as was intended before (Himmrich & Raynova, 2017).

This deadlock further continued. Cyprus is a member of the EU, and Turkey a member of NATO, with the Czech Republic being a part of both it was witness to the series of double vetoes – Turkey's in NATO, preventing the RC from engaging in any NATO security initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace. Meanwhile the RC uses its veto in the EU to block Turkey's implementation agreement into the European Defence Association (Acikmese & Triantaphyllou, 2012).

The Czech Republic is firmly supporting the approach of the integrations it is part of. Both the EU and NATO claim, although for different reasons that unification of Cyprus would lead to improvement in not only the relations between the two institutions which would allow better use of combined resources and deepen possibilities for cooperation, but also solve a strong issue both institutions face individually when concerning two of the primary actors in this crisis: RC and Turkey. However, the current TRNC government's policy is not one of reunification at all costs (Bouris & Kyris, 2017). The issues constituted during the Annan plan era persist, with some being more prevalent: Population, federalization and the issue of military intervention.

### **3. Practical Part: Hypotheses and Interviews**

This chapter focuses on the answers to the primary research questions asked by the author to several subjects with views into the problematics of the thesis' topic. As the topic of the thesis concerns the current policies of a state, it was decided that the optimal approach would be through interviewing individuals with knowledge and expertise. Originally, over 20 individuals were addressed, but due to scheduling conflicts or a plain absence of a response from them, only 6 were interviewed. The series of interviewees consists of three political representatives, two Members serving the Czech Republic in the House of Representatives, a Member of the European Parliament, two representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and one member of the academic community. All subjects hold some. Their answers to the questions were presented and compared to see how they fit within the parameters of the thesis' working hypotheses which could be used to explain the form and stark difference between the Czech Republic's approach to the subjects respectively.

The subjects interviewed were:

An Officer of the Department for Asia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic – An interviewee representing the Department for Asia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic specializing on the issues of Taiwan. The subject wished to remain anonymous but gave consent to their answers being used and quoted in the research.

An Officer of the Department for South and South-East Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic – An interviewee representing the Department for South and South-East Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic specializing on the issues of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus. The subject wished to remain anonymous, but gave consent to their answers being used and quoted in the research.

Markéta Gregorová – Member of the European Parliament and Member of the Euro-Parliamentary Committee for International Trade, with experience in interactions between Taiwan and the EU.

Richard Turcsányi – Assistant professor working for the Department of Asian Studies at the Palacký University in Olomouc, specializing in Czech-Chinese relations and the problematics of Taiwan.

Barbora Urbanová – Member of the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic and Vice-Chairwoman of the House Committee for International Relations

Marek Ženíšek – Member of the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic and Chairman of the House Committee for International Relations

**Work Hypothesis 1:** *The reason for the working relationship between the Czech Republic and Taiwan lies primarily in economic cooperation potential, not in proximity in values.*

The very reason for the duo nearing together in the 90s was the initial plan to engage in trade which could later lead to possible recognition. The economic partnership has proved advantageous for both of them. The ROC is the strongest global player in the field of microchips, dealing and trading with many countries in the world, even, ironically, the PRC who has become its largest trade partner. However, the investments coming from the ROC into the Czech Republic are currently larger than those coming from the PRC, and many of the political ventures were connected to the economic ones, including the delegation of Chairman Vystrčil which consisted of many business representatives.

**Work Hypothesis 2:** *The Czech Republic's approach to the ROC is still heavily influenced by its relations with the PRC.*

The Czech Republic officially supports the One-China policy and despite the fact that its and Taiwan's relations are positive, they can be attributed to a mostly economic advantage. Any movement towards positive development is in turn followed by a gesture from the governing bodies that the Czech Republic remains a fervent supporter

**Work Hypothesis 3:** *There is no advantageous potential in pursuing a better relationship with the TRNC*

The TRNC is a de facto state that is basically cut away from the rest of the world. Unlike the ROC, it has no prospects of being an advantageous partner neither in economy nor politics. The TRNC has no influence on world economy like the ROC's chip industry and is in fact dependent on support from outside, namely Turkey. In the political sphere, the Czech Republic is partners with the RC and a fellow member of the EU. And for a strategic position, it plays no role which could be used as a future advantage. Although the relations between the two countries are not as

strong compared to others, Cyprus still remains an ally. And for the interests of the Czech Republic, it remains more advantageous to support the RC rather than divert from the larger European approach similarly with Taiwan.

**Work Hypothesis 4:** *The fact that both subjects are de facto states plays only a small, if any, role in the Czech approach to them.*

From the very start it is visible that the Czech approach to both subjects is vastly different. The similarities that are there cannot be attributed to the fact that both the ROC and TRNC are de facto states. The reality lies in the individual field of advantageous cooperation with one when the other offers none such reprieve.

### **3.1. Czech Republic and Taiwan – Money Is More Valuable Than Values**

The subject of this hypothesis brought with it strong reactions, admitting the importance of economic cooperation, but with some stressing more the importance of common values and one interviewee even stating that the real core lies in a completely different vein. When the cooperation between the Czech Republic and the ROC began, it was in large thanks to Václav Havel's initiative and humanist values. From the texts analysed both from academic sources and official government ones, the implication could be made that the blooming relations began on the basis of promising economic cooperation and continued in the same vein. However, one cannot ignore the values of both states, openly priding themselves on freedom and democracy, while denouncing the totalitarian practices of the PRC. It was with these assumptions that this hypothesis was made, claiming that the economic potential of cooperation played a larger role in the broadening of relations between the two with the shared values being used only as a foundation.

In her response, Urbanová claims that the shared values between the two lands play the largest role in the relations. Ženíšek agrees with this, stating that sharing of key values is what connects the Czech Republic and the ROC. It is also obvious from public statements of other representatives from the current government parties that the wish to further build the cooperation between Taiwan and the Czech Republic is supposed to be wrapped in a coat of two cooperating democracies. The two representatives also agree on the importance of economic cooperation between the two.

The Officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs however states a different stance. According to them, the economic potential of Taiwan as geo-economical in the world plays the prime role in the approach the Czech Republic has taken towards the ROC. They stressed that the process of arriving to the current state of relations was a long one and the economic partnerships have lasted throughout the entire period. The political shared values with the ROC have been a place to start the long-term process, with the intended distancing away from Communism and the Eastern bloc. In his words, the ROC is a “silicone superpower” referring to Taiwan’s powerful position in global economics.

Turcsányi brings a completely new take on the relation. In his opinion, despite the ROC investments bringing large amounts of money, they are still small when taken in the big picture, the numbers laying in tenths or even hundredths of 1 percent of the economical intake. The proximity in values, on the other hand plays a much more important role in the interactions, but still not the primary one. According to him, the reason for the proximity and working long-term cooperation between the two lies in the individual position and willingness of the Czech Republic to build bridges towards Taiwan, sometimes even greater than the position of some larger integrations it is a part of, in this case, the EU.

The Czech Republic’s policy is partly in accordance with the EU position specifically in the part of not having any official inter-governmental relations with the ROC. All member states have some kind of representation, usually called the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office/Centre”, the Czech one working since November 1993. These “false embassies” serve the purpose of creating an official level of cooperation while allowing the individual countries to avoid any sign of actually recognising the ROC. An important factor is that the name Taiwan or ROC is never mentioned in the official name, as it could imply some recognition for the existence of Taiwan as a unit independent of the PRC. Such a stance is unacceptable due to the One-China policy the Czech Republic, and EU as a whole, comply with.

Gregorová states that for the EU as a whole, a good economic relation with the ROC is important, seeing as Taiwan is the 5<sup>th</sup> largest Asian partner, with the EU being the 4<sup>th</sup> biggest partner of the ROC, after the PRC, USA and Japan. Although any contact with the ROC is overshadowed by the economic giant that is the PRC, it must be stated that the ROC’s strong, near monopolised, position on the market with microchips and integrated circuits makes it a wanted partner in trade.

She also claims that with the ROC being a land which advocates democracy, freedom of press, etc. serves as a stark contrast to the PRC's one-party dictatorship and in that way is more similar to EU member states than the PRC.

Returning to Turcsányi's answer, according to him, the primary reason between the close relations between the Czech Republic and the ROC is neither economic, nor connected to shared values. He is convinced that the Czech position is based more on a strategic view connected to a look into the past. The PRC still claims Taiwan as a part of it and talks about reclaiming it with military means and that, he believes, goes against Czech interest, historically remembering the 1968 incursion of the Warsaw Pact armies to quell the perceived distancing from the Soviet regime. This event still lies strong in Czech memory. Turcsányi believes it is this connection and the overall antipathy the Czech Republic possesses towards communist dictatorships that drives the country to seek such good relations with the ROC, speculating that even if the ROC were to change and move away from democratic principles, the Czech Republic would still support them.

Comparing the answers and researched texts, it is quite certain to say that the hypothesis has not been confirmed. The relations between the Czech Republic and the ROC clearly relies on the existence of a working economic background. It is a very important secondary factor, however not the primary one. The fact still remains that both of them share similar beliefs and values in terms of democracy and freedom of speech with the added fact that the ROC faces a constant threat from the PRC makes the Czech Republic's approach a special case which cannot be engulfed simply by the constraints of economic cooperation.

### **3.2. Czech-Taiwanese Relations and the Role of China**

Ever since the Czech Republic and the ROC have begun the process of becoming closer, the shadow of the PRC hung over them. As stated earlier and in the works of *enter names here*, the PRC is a giant on the global market, being one of the most powerful world economies, an important trading partner to the EU and a country that watches cautiously how its partners adhere to the One-China policy. This hypothesis states that any progress made by the Czech Republic to improve its standing with the ROC is followed by steps that would assure Beijing of the Czech Republic's continuing compliance towards this policy and is based on previous texts analysed during the creation of the thesis.

The Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that the Czech Republic has its own version of understanding the One China principle, doing parallel actions in connection with the PRC and the ROC, wherever it serves the interests of the country. Even though these steps are often criticised by Beijing, the response would be that it fits within the Czech One China policy. The Czech Republic agrees that there is only one China, that being the PRC, however that doesn't exclude a possibility of cooperation with Taiwan while not officially recognising it as a state. Ženíšek concurs to that with the Czech Republic recognises the principle of one China, not the policy of One People's Republic of China which would require the individual countries to not have any interactions with the ROC on Taiwan. The Czech Republic thus reserves the right to have bi-lateral relations with Taiwan without recognising it.

Turcsányi argues that the good relations between the ROC and the Czech Republic stem not despite the Czech-Chinese relations, but because of them. He claims that the Czech Republic sees Taiwan as an "Anti-China", or at least it can be viewed like this from a certain perspective. Due to the Czech Republic's history with communist oppression, it sympathizes with Taiwan due to a common ground. This was also helped by the ROC's good-will reach after the Velvet Revolution, carrying through the 90s on Václav Havel's humanist wave and following up until today with the visits of Senate Chairman Vystrčil and House Chairwoman Pekarová-Adamová. He still stresses the fact that the Czech Republic does not recognise Taiwan, reminding the phone call between Petr Pavel and Tsai Ing-Wen, President of the ROC, immediately after his election in 2023 and says that it was controversial already, it would have been even more so if Pavel already was President of the Czech Republic.

He follows that in the EU there is a divide in the approach towards Taiwan, with the Czech stance being a very individual one comparing the reactions from other countries to Vystrčil's visit in 2020. He states that overall it was perceived and presented in large part by the Czech administration as a provocation, while in the bigger picture, it wasn't anything larger than a visit and the reaction from Beijing following it weren't excessive, aside from public criticisms or the usual threats and warnings from Beijing about the Czech Republic endangering the relations it has built with the PRC and recommendations for it to change its course if it doesn't want to face the consequences, no serious measures from the side of the PRC were taken. A great example to compare it with would be the opening of the "Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania" in

2021, a first such office which openly used the term Taiwan in its name. Unlike the lukewarm reaction to the Czech visit, this resulted in the immediate recalling of the Chinese ambassador in Vilnius and the expulsion of the Lithuanian ambassador in Beijing. The official interactions between the two countries were demoted to chargé d'affaires level. More importantly, the PRC blocked its ports to any goods coming from Lithuania and any items from other countries where Lithuanian parts were used.

In stark comparison between the two countries' approaches, both of whom are favourable towards the ROC, one could be described as poking the bear with a long stick, while the other as pouring honey all over yourself and dancing naked in front of it. While the Czech movements are ambitious and breaking barriers with visits that are the first of its kind – first official visit by a constitutional actor, first phone call between a president-elect and President of the ROC in years, etc. – they are merely gestures that have no real ramifications and are treated as such by the PRC. Much more attention was given to a following visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi a year later. Meanwhile the Lithuanian allowance of the name Taiwan being used by the Office was a direct challenge to the status quo that the PRC has set concerning their One China policy. And that challenge was met head on with a swift reaction.

The EU position as a whole is precarious in this. According to Gregorová, while the Chinese market is a large one with 1,5 billion consumers and the Union is dependent on Chinese export, it is also heavily dependent on the Taiwanese semi-conductor influx (Ash, 2002). As such, the EU must often balance its steps between the often - opposing interests of both the PRC and ROC while dealing with the policies of its member states which make decisions as independent units as seen in the examples of Czech Republic and Lithuania.

The Czech position regularly defies this standing, a sign of a confident foreign policy, in the words of Urbanová, which leads to some conflicts of interest. At the time of writing, the Czech Republic shows no sign of stepping away from its course, with the current Fiala administration being the first government to have an official proclamation of plans to expand relations with Taiwan in their program.

Reminding again of the Lithuanian step, the question arises: Would the Czech Republic make a similar step, if presented with the opportunity? There is no yes or no answer, as the opportunity hasn't arrived yet. Neither the PRC nor the Czech Republic probably wants to get into

such a position which is why the speculated visit of PM Petr Fiala to Beijing hasn't taken place yet. According to Turcsányi, China doesn't want to give Fiala a platform in which he could denounce them and in the same vein, Fiala doesn't want to be forced into a position where he could risk a possible deterioration in Czech-Chinese relations. Urbanová later adds that Vystrčil's and Pekarová-Adamová's visits were considered more informal acts and had a much more symbolic meaning than an actual practical one.

This hypothesis was firmly rejected by the responses of the interviewees. Although there was theoretical basis for the hypothesis, the answers gathered for this and the previous question firmly indicates that although the Czech position towards Taiwan is in some way influenced by its relations with the PRC, it is not subjected to it. The two relations exist on different paths which sometimes connect, but one is not subject to the other.

### **3.3. The Cold Czech (Dis)Connection with the TRNC**

The TRNC is an isolated subject, a part of an island with no strategic, political, or economic potential that would be worth pursuing.

Ever since the beginning of the Cyprus issue being solved and the failure of the Annan Plan, the Czech Republic supports the solution of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the framework of the UN, as well as the current efforts of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (further UNFICYP), that being the solution coming from negotiations between all concerned parties.

The Czech Republic does not have any working agreements with the TRNC, no interactions with Northern Cyprus outside of larger missions conducted by other organisations, the goal of which is to ease the planned reunification of Cyprus. There is no intention of establishing any bilateral relations which would work in a similar way as it does with Taiwan simply because there is no initiative to do so.

A great influence in the Czech approach, or lack thereof in this case, according to the Officer of the Department for South and Southeastern Europe, is its strong connections to Turkey, as it is the main influence on the de facto state and the only country in the world that recognises the TRNC as a state, with its economic support keeping it strictly in its sphere of influence.

Both Urbanová and Ženíšek agree with this statement, reminding that the Czech Republic agrees with the UN and EU stance on Cyprus reunification, as well as the fact that it supported such efforts since the Annan plan. The support is also in accordance with the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

When asked whether the lack of relations with the TRNC stems from cooperation and strategic potential, Urbanová disapproved of the notion. She claims that one of the parts is little to no activity from the TRNC to initiate any sort of contact, as well as stressing that the foreign policy of the Czech Republic is not based strictly on the idea that it might gain something from those relations. However, she does concede that there is little to no potential to explore even in accordance with the official policy.

Ženíšek answers in a similar vein, claiming that economic and strategic connections may serve to deepen existing relations, but are scarcely reason to engage them in the first place. He does however stress that the lack of cooperation potential is an important reason alongside others, including the Czech position within the frameworks of EU and UN to work towards reunification of Cyprus as a whole.

The lack of cooperation potential for the TRNC on the international scene is a key factor in the Czech approach towards, as was proven by the previously made answers, although not a primary one. Another important factor is the obvious dependence on Turkish support, that support being used sometimes as an extortion tool and the TRNC is often forced to adapt its policies to fulfil the expectations from Ankara. In conclusion, the hypothesis was not necessarily rejected, as its subject is still an important factor in the Czech approach, only not the primary one.

### **3.4. Role of the Subjects Being De Facto States**

This hypothesis comes from the overarching question that emanates from the answers given to the previous ones. Does the fact both research subjects are de facto states influence the approach the Czech Republic has taken towards either? The assumed answer was – no. In both subjects there lie stark differences that go beyond the simple box of de facto states. The ROC is a powerful self-sustained economy and force on the global scene that despite its limited recognition manages to influence the world on a large scale and as such is able to fortify its existence. Meanwhile, the

TRNC is a small de facto state effectively under the thumb of another force, Turkey, stuck between a rock and a hard place, not being able to compromise between its interests towards federalization and its necessity to adhere to Turkey's interests. The answers pertaining to this hypothesis mostly confirm these ideas.

Turcsányi says that in some way a connection must take place between states and de facto states, the fact that these entities are not recognised by the governments does not mean they do not exist and some sort of interaction must take place. When a de facto state exists, the Czech Republic must de facto acknowledge its existence, in cases Czech citizens find themselves in there, or the inhabitants of that region, identifying themselves as citizens of the de facto states, travel to the Czech Republic. As such, a sort of contact must exist, at least on consular levels, reminding of the interactions Slovakia has with Kosovo, an entity it does not recognise as a state.

Both Officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when asked stressed the important fact that the Czech Republic does not have any bilateral relations with the TRNC and the communication between the two is limited, nearly non-existent, taking place within boundaries of international missions and initiatives through the UN and EU, or in some cases solved through the Czech Embassy on Cyprus in Nicosia. The fact remains that the Czech Republic shows no signs of intent to expand this limited amount of interaction for reasons mentioned before: Turkish influence, low cooperation potential and the initiative to reunite Cyprus as a whole within the frameworks of the UN and EU efforts.

The ROC on the other hand is a de facto state working outside the necessity of recognition. The fact that many countries cooperate with it while still not recognising its alleged statehood is a supportive fact for this on its own, even more so, when taking into account the reality of the PRC, the country that claims Taiwan as part of itself, is at the same time the strongest economic partner the ROC has in the world. The Officer from the Department of Asia also claims that with the ROC's current position in the world, it does not need to stress the need for recognition from the states that interact with it. Any attempt to do so could result in them being put into an uncomfortable position which would risk their complete abandonment.

Turcsányi believes that there is no one given policy type taken towards de facto states. This idea is supported by different approaches to individual entities, during which he himself mentions Somaliland alongside the subjects of this research.

The hypothesis was proven true. The connection between both subjects, the ROC and TRNC, being de facto states has no actual bearing on the nature of the approach the Czech Republic takes towards either. The Czech Republic does not treat all de facto states in the same way. Both entities have such vast differences between them that the contrast in approaches can be more competently explained, as it is in previous hypotheses. There is no space for the Czech Republic to pursue any sort of bilateral relation with the TRNC when its long-term goal in terms of policy is to achieve its reintegration into Cyprus and making the island whole again. Meanwhile, the ROC relations have proven their worth and continue to do so. At the time of writing, the Taiwanese National Science and Technology Council Minister Wu Tsung-tsong announced that the ROC has to launch its first overseas integrated circuit training centre which would be located in Prague, with the scheduled start in September 2024. (Taiwan News, 2024)

## Conclusion

The goal of the thesis was to establish how the approach of the Czech Republic towards the Republic of China and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus respectively.

This thesis has used existing definitions of a de facto state to classify both the ROC and TRNC as de facto states with the explanation of how each subject fulfils the conditions to be called so, analysed the prior relations between the subjects and the Czech Republic and gave insight into the existing reasons why these relations are the way they are.

There were four hypotheses researched in this thesis. Out of them, only one was fully confirmed. The fact that the ROC and TRNC are de facto states has no actual bearing on the nature of the approach the Czech Republic has adopted towards them. The reality lies in the workings of both de facto states on their own, with Taiwan being a much more advantageous and willing ally than Northern Cyprus.

One hypothesis was fully rejected – the idea that the Czech Republic’s relation with Taiwan is conditioned by its relations with the PRC in favour of China. It was confirmed that the relations between Prague and Beijing play important parts, but in the end, these relations work parallel of each other, not being one direct influence on themselves. Czech Republic recognises the PRC and does not recognise the ROC, but reserves the right to keep relations with Taiwan while in line with the One China principle.

The remaining two hypotheses were neither outright confirmed, nor completely rejected. They were only a partial look into the whole issue. The hypotheses focused simply on the economic aspect of the approach towards Taiwan, not taking into account the fact it is a partial primary reason, not *the* primary reason, working more within a framework of strategic and economic advantages, shared common values and finally the entire individual Czech approach towards China and viewing Taiwan as an “Anti-China”.

In the hypothesis concerning the approach to the TRNC the research hit a similar obstacle. The strategic disadvantages of the TRNC are not the primary reason the Czech Republic does not pursue any possible improvement in the near non-existent interactions between them. It is once again a part of a larger picture in combination with the obvious overarching power of Turkey over Northern Cyprus and most importantly the fact that the Czech foreign policy is firmly behind the

reunification of Cyprus.

The research shows much more space to continue further, perhaps in expanding the framework of approach to more de facto states to compare. But all in all, the goal of the thesis was achieved and the questions put up by it were answered. In summary, the approach of the Czech Republic towards Taiwan and Northern Cyprus contains a series of intricate differences that has a rich history behind it. The main message remains is that there is no given policy towards de facto states as a whole and the approach cannot be attributed to the relation the Czech Republic has with the countries that claim them.

## Literature

ACIKMESE, S. A., & TRIANTAPHYLLOU, D. (2012). The NATO–EU–Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus conundrum. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 12(4), 555-573. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.741846>

ASH, R. (2002). Economic Relations between Taiwan and Europe. *The China Quarterly*, 169(Special Issue), 154-180.

ASSMUSSEN, J. (2004). Cyprus After The Failure of The Annan Plan. *European Center for Minority Issues Brief no. 11*. [https://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1997/pdf/brief\\_11.pdf](https://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1997/pdf/brief_11.pdf)

BAHCHELI, T., BARTMANN, B., & SREBRNIK, H. (2004). *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty Politics/International relations* (ilustrované vydání). Routledge.

BAHCHELI, T., & NOEL, S. (2010). The political evolution of Northern Cyprus and its effect on Turkish-Cypriot relations with Turkey. *Cyprus Review*, 22(2), 139-148. <https://www.cyprusreview.org/index.php/cr/article/view/204>

BEBLER, A. (Ed.). (2015). *“Frozen conflicts” in Europe* (1st ed.). Verlag Barbara Budrich. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvdf0bmg>

BBC (2023). Five things we learned from the Biden-Xi meeting. *BBC News* <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67433961>

BOURIS, D., & KYRIS, G. (2017). Europeanisation, Sovereignty and Contested States: The EU in northern Cyprus and Palestine. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19(4), 755-771. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117727534>

CASAGLIA, A. (2019). Northern Cyprus as an ‘Inner Neighbour’: A Critical Analysis of European Union Enlargement in Cyprus. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 26(1), 37-49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776418756933>

ČESKÝ ROZHLAS (2020). ‚Jsem Tchajwanec,‘ prohlásil Vystrčil. Návštěva Tchaj-wanu vzbudila pozitivní i velmi kritické ohlasy. *Český rozhlas*. [https://www.irozhlaz.cz/zpravy-domov/milos-vystrcil-senat-opozice-milos-zeman-cesta-na-tchajwan-reakce\\_2012231529\\_ban](https://www.irozhlaz.cz/zpravy-domov/milos-vystrcil-senat-opozice-milos-zeman-cesta-na-tchajwan-reakce_2012231529_ban)

ČESKÝ ROZHLAS (2023) Pavel mluvil s prezidentkou Tchaj-wanu, chtějí posílit partnerství. Čína kvůli telefonátu kontaktovala Prahu. *Český rozhlas*. [https://www.irozhlaz.cz/zpravy-svet/cina-pavel-tchajwan-telefonat-kontakt\\_2301301534\\_til](https://www.irozhlaz.cz/zpravy-svet/cina-pavel-tchajwan-telefonat-kontakt_2301301534_til)

DEMBINSKÁ, M., & CAMPANA, A. (2017). Frozen Conflicts and Internal Dynamics of De Facto States: Perspectives and Directions for Research. *International Studies Review*, 19(2), 254-278. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix010>

DITTMER, L. (2004). Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity. *Asian Survey*, 44(4), 475-483. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.4.475>

DRUN, J. (2017). One China, Multiple Interpretations. *Center for Advanced China Research*.

DRUN, J., & GLASER, B. (2022). The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan's Access to the United Nations. *German Marshall Fund of the United States*. <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Drun%26Glaser-distortion-un-resolution-2758-limit-taiwans-access.pdf>

EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (2024). Joint Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell and Commissioner Elisa Ferreira on the appointment by the UN Secretary General of new Personal Envoy on Cyprus. *European Union*. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_24\\_61](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_61)

FLOREA, A. (2014). De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011): A New Data Set. *International Interactions*, 40(5), 788-811. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.915543>

FÜRST, R. (2017). Czechia's 1 Relations with China. In *China's Relations with Central and Eastern Europe From "Old Comrades" to New Partners* (pp. 97-116). Routledge. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315226644-8/czechia-1-relations-china-rudolf-f%C3%BCrst>

HANSEN, T. B., & STEPPUTAT, F. (2005). *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World* *Anthropology online*. Princeton University Press.

HAVEL, V. (1995) Speech at the Special Session of the United Nations Assembly. *Knihovna Václava Havla*. <https://archive.vaclavhavel-library.org/Archive/HavelWork?eventType=Projev&sort=2&lang=cs&eventYear=1995&&page=5#>

HIMMIRICH, J., & RAYNOVA, D. (2017). *EU-NATO Relations: Inching forward?* European Leadership Network. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17438>

CHEN, K. W. (2008). Disciplining Taiwan: The Kuomintang's Methods of Control during the White Terror Era (1947–1987), *Taiwan International Studies Quarterly*, 4, 4, 185–210. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Disciplining-Taiwan%3AThe-Kuomintang's-Methods-of-the-Chen/84574606c5d243cc954f9165e31e648d285c239f# citing-papers>

KER-LINDSAY, J., & BERG, E. (2018). Introduction: A Conceptual Framework for Engagement with de facto States. *Ethnopolitics*, 17(4), 335-342. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2018.1495362>

KOLSTØ, P. (2006). The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(6), 723-740. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343306068102>

KOWALSKI, B. (2022). Central and Eastern Europe, China's Core Interests, and the Limits of Relational Politics: Lessons from the Czech Republic in the 2010s. *East European Politics and Societies*, 36(01), 51-74. <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1013425>

KOWALSKI, B., & NOLAN, P., GERRITS, A. (Ed.). (2017). China's foreign policy towards Central and Eastern Europe: The "16+1" format in the South-South cooperation perspective. Cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary. *Cambridge Journal of*, 1, 90-131. <https://doi.org/10.22261/7R65ZH>

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2024). Embassies & Missions. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China*. <https://en.mofa.gov.tw/CountryAreaInfoEn.aspx?CASN=5&n=1287&sms=0>

NECHVÁTALOVÁ, L. (2020) Czech Senate President in Taiwan. *V4 Human Rights Review*, 4(2), 10-11. [https://test.humanrightscentre.org/sites/default/files/attachement/bulletin/v4humanrightsreview\\_winter2020.pdf#page=10](https://test.humanrightscentre.org/sites/default/files/attachement/bulletin/v4humanrightsreview_winter2020.pdf#page=10)

NUGENT, N. (2000). EU Enlargement and the "Cyprus Problem." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 131-150. [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jcmks38&div=9&g\\_sent=1&casa\\_token=9c7QR2VayPUAAAAA:AhKKB7qJA9CwIJnUNSQBfpcwzrh9gd7kIL5CbWJoNoIzi7mdK76dqV8c3qz6-HFpSLtLsLPfQ.&collection=journals](https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jcmks38&div=9&g_sent=1&casa_token=9c7QR2VayPUAAAAA:AhKKB7qJA9CwIJnUNSQBfpcwzrh9gd7kIL5CbWJoNoIzi7mdK76dqV8c3qz6-HFpSLtLsLPfQ.&collection=journals)

ÖZPEK, B. B. (2014). The Role of Democracy in the Recognition of De Facto States: An Empirical Assessment. *Global Governance*, 20(4), 585-599. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24526326>

PEGG, S. (2019). *International Society and the De Facto State Routledge Revivals*. Routledge.

REUTERS. (2024). And Then There Were 12: Taiwan's Diplomatic Allies. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/then-there-were-13-taiwans-diplomatic-allies-2023-03-26/>

SAFTY, A. (2011). The Cyprus Question: Diplomacy and International Law. *iUniverse*.

SONG, W. (Ed.). (2018). *China's Relations with Central and Eastern Europe From "Old Comrades" to New Partners*. Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Relations-with-Central-and-Eastern-Europe-From-Old-Comrades-to-New-Partners/Song/p/book/9780367886127>

SO, A. Y. (2011). "One Country, Two Systems" and Hong Kong-China National Integration: A Crisis-Transformation Perspective. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 41(1), 99-116. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2011.530039>

SÖZEN, A., & ÖZERSAY, K. (2006). The Annan Plan: State succession or continuity. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43(1), 125-141. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200601079773>

ŠEBEŇA, M., & TURCSÁNYI, R. Q. (2021). Divided national identity and COVID-19. *China Review*, 21(2), 35-64. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Richard-Turcsanyi/publication/352374493\\_Divided\\_national\\_identity\\_and\\_Covid-19\\_How\\_China\\_has\\_become\\_a\\_symbol\\_of\\_a\\_major\\_political\\_cleavage\\_in\\_the\\_Czech\\_Republic](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Richard-Turcsanyi/publication/352374493_Divided_national_identity_and_Covid-19_How_China_has_become_a_symbol_of_a_major_political_cleavage_in_the_Czech_Republic)

[/links/60c73d30299bf1949f589502/Divided-national-identity-and-Covid-19-How-China-has-become-a-symbol-of-a-major-political-cleavage-in-the-Czech-Republic.pdf?origin=journalDetail&\\_tp=eyJwYWdlIjoiam91cm5hbERldGFpbCJ9](/links/60c73d30299bf1949f589502/Divided-national-identity-and-Covid-19-How-China-has-become-a-symbol-of-a-major-political-cleavage-in-the-Czech-Republic.pdf?origin=journalDetail&_tp=eyJwYWdlIjoiam91cm5hbERldGFpbCJ9)

TAIPEI TIMES (2023). Czech Republic stands with you, Adamova says. *Taipei Times*. <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/03/29/2003796914>

NAKHIENGCHANH, M. (2024). Taiwan to launch first overseas IC training center in Prague. *Taiwan News*. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5666884>

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (1947). Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan). *Laws and Regulations Database of The Republic of China (Taiwan)*. <https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000001>

THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. (1960). Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. *Law Office of the Republic of Cyprus*. <https://www.law.gov.cy/law/law.nsf/constitution-en/constitution-en?OpenDocument>

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS. (1983). Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. *Cypnet*. <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/main/polsyst/constitution/>

TUBILEWICZ, C. (2007). *Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe: Shopping for Allies* Routledge Contemporary Asia Series (illustrated edition). Routledge.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL. (1975). Resolution 367 of 12 March 1975. *United Nations Security Council Resolutions*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/367>

US CONGRESS (1955) H.J.Res.159 - Joint resolution authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area. *Congress of the USA*. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/84th-congress/house-joint-resolution/159/text>

## **Appendix**

### **Interviews**

An Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working at the Department for Asia. Interview took place in Prague on 10<sup>th</sup> April 2024.

An Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working at the Department for East and South-East Europe. Interview took place in Prague on 11<sup>th</sup> April 2024

Markéta Gregorová, Representative in the European Parliament. Interview took place over internet communication on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2024.

Richard Turcsányi, Assistant Professor at the Palacký University in Olomouc, Department of Asian Studies. Interview took place in Olomouc on 5<sup>th</sup> April 2024.

Barbora Urbanová, Representative in the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic. Interview took place over internet communication on 10<sup>th</sup> April 2024.

Marek Ženíšek, Representative in the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic. Interview took place over internet communication on 12<sup>th</sup> April 2024.

## **Abstract/Abstrakt**

### **Abstract**

This thesis aims to analyse and compare the differences in the approach of the Czech Republic towards two de facto states – Taiwan and Northern Cyprus. This thesis should offer explanation on why the policy of the Czech Republic is so starkly different when dealing with two entities which fit into the same category.

The thesis is divided into 3 chapters. The first defines a de facto state and subsequently fits the subject into that definition. The second chapter analyses the interactions the Czech Republic had with both subjects prior to the time of writing. Finally, the third chapter assesses the reasons for why the Czech approach is significantly different in the cases of Taiwan and Northern Cyprus. The results of the research are acquired via interviews with experts or persons capable of answering questions from both the political and academic field.

The result of the research is that the fact the subjects are de facto states plays no role in the actual policy, as the Czech Republic has no united policy when dealing with de facto states. It was also discovered that the case of Taiwan is special among de facto states and Czech-Taiwanese relations are unique when it comes to relations between Taiwan and other countries.

**Key words:** De facto state, Foreign policy of the Czech Republic, Taiwan, Northern Cyprus.

## **Abstrakt**

Cílem této práce je zanalyzovat a srovnat rozdíly v přístupu České republiky ke dvěma de facto státům – Tchaj-wanu a Severnímu Kypru. Tato práce by měla nabídnout vysvětlení proč je postoj České republiky tak výrazně rozdílný při jednání se dvěma entitami, které spadají do stejné kategorie.

Práce je rozdělena na tři kapitoly. První kapitola definuje de facto stát a následně zasazuje subjekty do této definice. Druhá kapitola analyzuje interakce mezi Českou republikou a subjekty před časem sepsání práce. Poslední, třetí, kapitola zhodnocuje důvody, proč je český přístup v případech Tchaj-wanu a Severního Kypru tak významně odlišný. Výsledky výzkumu jsou získány skrze rozhovory s experty a povolanými osobami jak z oblasti politiky, tak akademie.

Výsledkem práce je zjištění, že fakt, že oba subjekty jsou de facto státy nehraje ve skutečné pozici žádnou roli, jelikož Česká republika nemá sjednocenou politiku při jednání s de facto státy. Dále bylo zjištěno, že případ Tchaj-wanu je jedinečný mezi de facto státy a vztahy mezi Českou republikou a Tchaj-wanem jsou unikátní na poli vztahů Tchaj-wanu s jinými zeměmi.

**Klíčová slova:** De facto stát, Zahraniční politika České republiky, Tchaj-wan, Severní Kypr.